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[Daeil Kim]
Enhancing the Compensatory Roles of Financial Regulatory Agencies in
South Korea: Lessons from the U.S. SEC’s FAIR Fund

Recent financial scandals in South Korea that caused massive harms to financial
consumers instigated voices that financial regulators should play a more active role in
recompensing victims for losses incurred by misconduct in the financial market.

In this

regard, this thesis aims to suggest several considerations in developing the compensation
scheme for injured financial consumers in Korea.

This thesis first reviews the Federal

Account for Investor Restitution (FAIR) Fund operated by the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission.

Specifically, it broadly addresses the history, overall process,

operation, and major issues related to the FAIR Fund. Based on the FAIR Fund review,
this thesis suggests several considerations financial regulators and legislators in Korea
should take into account when developing a public compensation system.
In brief, this thesis suggests that public compensation in Korea needs to be
considered in conjunction with the strength of monetary sanctions in the financial
regulatory arena.

It also suggests that policymakers should consider other factors such as

the availability of private compensation, the adequacy of procedures, and the regulatory
agency’s mission and resources.

This study also emphasizes that, in developing a

compensation scheme, the focus should be on how the regulators can enhance their
compensatory role while maintaining the deterrence effect of securities enforcement
actions.
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I. Introduction

A. Background
Starting in late 2013, South Korea’s financial regulators have struggled to provide
relief for victims aggrieved by two financial scandals that occurred one after the other: first,
the ‘Tong Yang crisis’ that resulted from the Tong Yang affiliates’ fraudulent issuance of
securities,1 and second, the massive leak of personal information by major credit card
companies. 2

These two scandals resembled each other in that they gave rise to

Five affiliates of the Tong Yang Group, which was South Korea’s 38th largest conglomerate, filed for
bankruptcy reorganization in court on September 30, 2013 (two other affiliates filed on October 1, 2013).
Since shortly before filing in court the Group had aggressively issued corporate bonds and commercial papers
to individual investors in an effort to make up for their liquidity deficit; it was alleged that Tong Yang affiliates
fraudulently issued securities to investors even though the companies knew in advance that they would be
unable pay off their maturing debts and had even prepared for the court filing. It was also alleged that the
Tong Yang Securities Company, which was the affiliated brokerage firm, sold affiliates’ securities to investors
without sufficiently explaining the relevant risks on investment in order to promote sales. Soon after this
incident occurred, the FSS and the prosecution began an investigation of related parties including issuers,
their officials, and an affiliated brokerage firm. For more details on this case, see Three Tong Yang Affiliates
File for Court Receivership, THE KOREA HERALD, Sep. 30, 2013, available at
http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20130930000259 (last visited on May 18, 2015); Yon-se Kim,
Tong Yang Under Fire for Unethical Deal, THE KOREA HERALD, Oct. 2, 2013, available at
http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20131002000740 (last visited on May 18, 2015); Press Release,
FSS, Geumgamwon Bunjaengjojeongwi Dongyanggeulub Tuja Gwanlyeon Bunjaengjojeong Gyeoljeong
[The Financial Disputes Mediation Committee of the FSS made mediation decision on disputes related to
investment on Tong Yang Group], July 31, 2014 (hereinafter “PRESS RELEASE ON TONG YANG MEDIATION”),
available
at
http://www.fss.or.kr/fss/kr/promo/bodobbs_view.jsp?seqno=18010&no=56&s_title=%B5%BF%BE%E7&s
_kind=title&page=1 (last visited on May 18, 2015).
1

The massive client data leakage of credit card companies became known through the prosecution’s
investigation. According to the prosecution, the personal information of credit card holders, including
names, social security numbers, addresses, phone numbers, incomes, and designated bank account numbers
on 104 million credit cards issued by three credit card companies were leaked outside the companies. The
information leakage was caused by a young technician who was hired by an individual credit rating company.
See Press Release, Changwon District Prosecutor’s Office, Kadeuhoesa Gogaegjeongbo Yuchul Sageon
Junggan Susagyeolgwa [Interim Brief for investigation on Client Information Leak of Credit Card Companies]
(Jan.
8,
2014),
available
at
http://www.spo.go.kr/changwon/notice/press/press.jsp?mode=view&article_no=567739&pager.offset=0&s
earch:search_val:search=%25C4%25AB%25B5%25E5%25C8%25B8%25BB%25E7&search:search_val0:
equals0=&search:search_key:search=article_title&search:search_field0:equals0=A.etc_char1&board_no=2
2

1

widespread harm to financial consumers, such as investors and credit card holders, and
regulators were blamed for failing to manage the misconduct in the financial market. 3
Even though victims and political entities called for prompt measures from regulators to
rectify their damages, Korean regulators did not have much more to do than impose
sanctions on violators and mediate related disputes between customers and the financial
intermediary.4

In the wake of these scandals, arguments were raised that the government

should play a more active role in recompensing victims for losses incurred by financial
institutions’ violation of the law.5

Similarly, the National Assembly amended the law to

&stype= (last visited on May 18, 2015); Sang-Hun Choi, Theft of Data Fuels Worries in South Korea, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 20, 2014, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/21/business/international/theft-of-datafuels-worries-in-south-korea.html?_r=0 (last visited on May 18, 2015).
3

The FSS reported that more than 41,000 retail investors suffered collective losses of an estimated 1.7 billion
dollars from the Tong Yang affair. PRESS RELEASE ON TONG YANG MEDIATION, supra note 1, at 8. Investors
not only filed a number of suits including securities class actions against Tong Yang affiliates, but also filed
for mediation in the FSS to seek compensation from Tong Yang Securities Company. In the personal
information leak case, even though it has been rarely reported that victims experienced actual economic
losses, such as a third party’s loan application based on the leaked information, a number of actions were
filed to recover damages for emotional.
In the Tong Yang case, after the FSS’s investigation, the Securities and Futures Commission reported related
parties, including the chairman of Tong Yang Group, to the prosecution on charges of securities law violations
in January 2014. See Press Release, FSC & FSS, Jabonsijang Bulgongjeonggeolaee Daehan Josagyeolgwa
Jochi [Regulatory Actions on Unfair Trading in the Capital Market] (Jan. 8, 2014), available at
http://www.fss.or.kr/fss/kr/promo/bodobbs_view.jsp?seqno=17493&no=251&s_title=%BA%D2%B0%F8
%C1%A4%B0%C5%B7%A1&s_kind=title&page=2 (last visited on May 18, 2015). In addition, the FSS
is currently proceeding with the disciplinary procedure against Tong Yang Securities Company. To deal
with investors’ claims against the brokerage firm that sold securities, the FSS also collectively received filings
from investors’ for dispute mediation. The mediation committee held the brokerage firm liable in 24,000
contracts out of 36,000 contracts made by 16,000 investors who filed for mediation, and made a mediation
decision that investors are eligible to recover 15 percent to 50 percent of investment amounts from the
brokerage firm, depending on such factors like the individual’s investment experience, knowledge, age, and
occupation. PRESS RELEASE ON TONG YANG MEDIATION, supra note1, at 3.
4

5

See, e.g., Dae Hyeong Jo, Geumyungsobijabohogigeum Doib Nonuiwa Gaeseongwaje [Discussion for
implementation of the Financial Consumer Protection Fund and Issues for its Improvement], 902 ISYUWA
NONJEOM [ISSUE & POINT], National Assembly Research Service (Aug. 26, 2014) (reviewing the importance
and legal issues of the Financial Consumer Protection Fund in light of ex-post financial consumer protection).
2

require that the regulatory authority take responsibility for matters on damage relief such
as restitution.6
In addition, in response to recent financial disasters and a strong deregulation drive
led by President Park Geun-hye, voices are increasing that financial regulators should
tighten supervision over financial institutions and have a stronger arsenal in order to
prevent financial incidents which may increase in the aftermath of deregulation.7

To this

end, it is suggested that Korea’s financial regulator should retain the authority to make use
of monetary sanctions more actively in its enforcement actions to deter future violations of
financial laws.8

6

The Congress amended the Act on the Establishment, etc. of Financial Services Commission in May 2014
in order to assign the FSC its new mission of relieving financial consumers’ damages. The amendment
added “matters concerning remedies for damage, such as the protection of and compensation to financial
consumers” as one of the FSC’s roles in subparagraph 5 of Article 17. Ki Sik Kim, a congressman who
submitted the bill, explained the reason for proposal as follows:
A series of massive financial harms caused by financial institution’s violation of laws show that the
FSC’s current function of sanction is not sufficient to accomplish the legislative intent to establish
sound credit order and fair financial transaction practices, and protect financial consumers such as
depositors and investors. In specific, the FSC currently do not have any authority that the
Commission forces a financial institution to restitute quickly and adequately widespread harms
caused by the financial incident.
The proposal originally intended to adopt the Consumer Redress Scheme utilized by the U.K. Financial
Services Authority for financial consumers’ damage relief, but the National Policy Committee of the National
Assembly which reviewed the proposal, decided to stipulate the statute more broadly so as that government
can study and develop adequate compensation model. See National Policy Committee,
Geumyungwiwonhoeui seolchideunge gwanhan beoblyul ilbugaejeongbeoblyulan geomtobogoseo [Review
on the amendment of the Act on the Establishment, etc. of Financial Services Commission] (May 1, 2014).
To keep pace with the deregulation drive, in July 2014, the FSC announced the ‘Financial Regulation
Reform Plan’ which aims to improve 700 cases selected after review of 1,700 cases of regulations. The FSC
also stressed the importance of strengthening the internal control system of the financial institutions and
enhancing the effectiveness of the monetary penalty in order to block the side effects of deregulation. Press
Release, FSC, Geumyunggyuje Gaehyeogbangan Balpyo: Hyeonjang Jungsimeulo Sogdogamissge Chujin
[Announcing the Financial Regulation Reform Plan: Pushing Ahead with Speed], July 9, 2014, available at
http://www.fsc.go.kr/info/ntc_news_view.jsp?bbsid=BBS0030&page=1&sch1=subject&sword=%EA%B7
%9C%EC%A0%9C&r_url=&menu=7210100&no=29906 (last visited on May 18, 2015).
7

8

See generally, Yong Chan Lee, Monetary Sanction on Financial Institutions in Korea: Problems and
Proposals for Improvement, 9-3 CHUNG-ANG L. REV. 537 (2007) (pointing out that while disciplinary
3

However, under the current monetary sanction system, when the financial
regulator imposes monetary sanctions on violators, the collected monies are transferred to
the National Treasury account.

Accordingly, as the penalty amounts increase, it may raise

the question of whether it is proper for the government to keep the funds stemming from a
violator’s misconduct that caused financial consumers’ damages without distributing those
monies for the relief of victims.9
Therefore, when discussing how to improve the monetary sanction system in the
financial regulatory domain, the use of the monies collected from monetary sanctions also
needs to be considered at the same time.

In this respect, the history of securities regulation

in the United States (U.S.) offers a valuable example for Korean regulators.

In the U.S.,

section 30810 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”)11 authorizes the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) to distribute civil monetary penalties through the
Federal Account for Investor Restitution (FAIR) Fund for the relief of investors victimized

sanction is to take place mainly in the form of professional sanctions, monetary sanction is limited both in its
scope and imposition, and also arguing that the government should supplement current monetary sanction in
the short run, and initiate the penalty surcharge against individual employees in the long run); Byoung Youn
Kim, Introduction of Financial Penalty against Unfair Transaction Under Capital Market and Financial
Investment Service Act, 32-4 COMMERCIAL L. STUDY 73, 78-79 (2014) (arguing that in addition to the
criminal penalty, the monetary sanction needs to be imposed in order to put teeth in the regulation of unfair
trading such as insider trading, market manipulation, and fraudulent trading).
See, e.g., Taeseong Lee, Kadeusa Yuchul Pihaejaneun Gugmininde … Gwajinggeumeun Jeongbuga
Kkulkkeog? [The Public Was Damaged by Credit Card Information Leak, But Will the Government Gulp
Down
the
Monetary
Penalty?],
MONEY
TODAY,
Feb.
3,
2014,
available
at
http://www.mt.co.kr/view/mtview.php?type=1&no=2014020311255473049&outlink=1 (last visited on May
18, 2015) (stressing that punitive penalty system which the government is pushing is far from compensation
for victims).
9

10

15 U.S.C. § 7246.

11

Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18 and 28 U.S.C.).
4

in connection with securities law violations.12

While “Fair Fund” distributions provide

defrauded investors with the opportunity to recover their financial losses, on the other hand,
some aspects have raised regulatory concerns.

Therefore, reviewing the SEC’s Fair Fund

will provide useful guidance to Korean financial regulators and legislators when they
develop a compensation scheme commensurate with the Korean financial regulatory
regime.

B. Purpose and Synopsis

The purpose of this study is to review the operation of and major issues with the
U.S. SEC’s Fair Fund and provide Korean financial regulators and lawmakers with
suggestions for developing the compensation scheme for widespread harm caused in the
financial market.

Specifically, since the SEC’s Fair Fund is unfamiliar under the Korean

legal system and has never been studied by Korean law scholars, this study describes the
Fair Fund in detail to provide useful information to readers.
This study consists of six parts.

Part II begins with an overview of Korea’s

financial regulatory system, and subsequently reviews the current compensatory schemes
exercised by financial regulators: the first is financial dispute mediation, which has
traditionally been used to resolve disputes between financial consumers and financial
institutions. The other is the refund of damages incurred by phishing frauds, which has

12

Section 308(a) of the SOX (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7246(a)).
5

been recently introduced.

Part II also argues that the current compensatory functions are

restrictive for handling compensation for massive harms caused by violations of financial
laws.
Before reviewing the Fair Fund, Part III provides a brief overview of the history
of the SEC’s authority over monetary sanctions in its enforcement actions.

Even though

the SEC retains a variety of tools in its enforcement to impose sanctions on a securities law
violator, the ability to seek disgorgement and civil monetary penalties is relatively recent
in the SEC’s history. The SEC’s authority to seek civil monetary penalties in its
enforcement actions raised questions about the relationship with criminal penalties.

Thus,

Part III examines the relationship between civil and criminal monetary penalties from the
perspective of parallel civil and criminal proceedings.
Part IV comprehensively reviews the Fair Fund under the U.S. securities
regulatory system.

First, Part IV provides an overview of the history of the Fair Fund and

the SEC’s efforts to improve the Fair Fund distribution.

Next, it explores the overall

process from creation of the Fair Fund to the termination of distributions, and introduces
statistics and analyses of past Fair Fund distributions. Third, despite the SEC’s efforts,
scholars have criticized the Fair Fund in several respects.

Thus, Part IV discusses

criticisms of the Fair Fund distribution such as the circularity or wealth transfer problem,
conflicts with bankruptcy law, duplication of private litigations, conflicts with the SEC’s
missions, and lack of procedural protection.

Further, this Part suggests several cases

where the Fair Fund can serve as a useful remedy without creating potential problems.
Based on the Fair Fund review, Part V suggests several considerations in
developing the compensation scheme for injured financial consumers in Korea.
6

It

suggests that public compensation needs to be considered in conjunction with the strength
of monetary sanctions in the financial regulatory arena.

It also suggests that policymakers

should consider other factors such as the availability of private compensation, the adequacy
of procedures, and the regulatory agency’s mission and resources.
a summary of this study.

7

Part VI concludes with

II. Current Compensatory Schemes in Korea

Before reviewing the SEC’s Fair Fund, this Part briefly overviews the financial
regulatory system in Korea and introduces the two compensation schemes Korean
regulators currently use to relieve damages to financial consumers incurred in the course
of financial transactions: (1) Financial Disputes Mediation and (2) Refund of Damages
Incurred by Phishing Frauds.

A. Financial Regulatory System in South Korea13

Unlike the U.S. where federal financial regulatory authority over financial
institutions is dispersed among different federal agencies such as the SEC, CFTC, OCC,
NCUA, FHFA, and Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Korea has an integrated
financial supervisory system, which means that a variety of financial institutions are under
the supervision of the same regulatory agencies.14

Such regulatory authority is primarily

vested in the Financial Services Commission (“FSC”), the Securities and Futures
Commission (“SFC”), and the Financial Supervisory Service (“FSS”) pursuant to the Act

13

See generally, FINANCIAL SUPERVISORY SERVICE, FSS HANDBOOK, 1, 11-21 (2014), available at
http://english.fss.or.kr/fss/en/publications/system/list.jsp?bbsid=1289364537633 (last visited on May 18,
2015).
14

The current integrated supervisory system was initiated in 1999 based on recommendations by the
Presidential Committee on Financial Reform in 1997. This regulatory reform led to the consolidation of four
financial supervisory bodies, which were the Office of Bank Supervision (OBS), the Securities Supervisory
Board (SSB), the Insurance Supervisory Board (ISB), and the Non-bank Supervisory Authority (NSA), into
a single supervisory agency, the Financial Supervisory Service. Along with consolidation, the Financial
Supervisory Commission (currently Financial Services Commission) and the Securities and Futures
Commission were established in 1998 to supervise the integrated agency. Id. at 11-12.
8

on the Establishment, etc. of Financial Services Commission (“FSC Establishment Act”)
and related financial laws.
First, the FSC has broad authority on matters related to financial markets such as
planning financial market policy, establishing financial supervisory regulations, issuing
licenses to new businesses or revoking licenses, and imposing sanctions on violators of
financial laws and regulations. 15

Second, the SFC has authority over capital market

investigations, accounting standards, and reviewing audit reports.16

In addition, the SFC

conducts preliminary review of matters relating to the securities and futures market to be
deliberated by the FSC.

Lastly, the FSS, which is an independent agency and not a part

of the administration, primarily engages in regulatory activities such as the ongoing
supervision and on-site examination of financial institutions, investigating the capital
market, and consumer protection.17

The FSS largely performs matters that belong to the

authority of the FSC and the SFC by delegation under the statutes.

The FSC and FSS also

have rule-making authority to regulate matters delegated by the relevant financial laws.
In matters dealing with financial law enforcement such as examinations of
financial institutions or investigations of capital market violations, the FSS staff are the
first to initiate the examination or investigation process.

When the FSS staff discover an

15

The FSC is led by nine Commissioners including the Chairman and the Vice Chairman who serve a threeyear term and are appointed by the President. The FSC has six bureaus and one division with over 251
officials. Id. at 16.
16

The SFC consists of five Commissioners and the Vice Chairman of the FSC concurrently holds the position
of the Chairman of the SFC. Id. at 17.
17

The FSS is headed by the Governor. Under the law, up to four Senior Deputy Governors, up to nine Deputy
Governors, and a Chief Executive Auditor may be appointed under the Governor. The Governor and the
Chief Executive Auditor are appointed by the President with the recommendation of the Chairman of the
FSC. Id.
9

alleged violation as a result of the examination or investigation, and after review by the
Enforcement Review Committee (in the case of an examination) or the Deliberative
Committee (in the case of an investigation), the FSS reports its findings and proposed
sanctions of the alleged violation to the FSC or SFC unless the sanction is authorized by
the Governor of the FSS pursuant to the laws.

After deliberating on a proposal in the

meeting, the FSC or SFC approve or deny the proposal, or amend the proposal to impose
the decided upon sanction.

If a violation is subject to criminal penalties, the FSC or SFC

refers the case to the criminal authorities such as the prosecution.

B.

Current Compensatory Schemes

1. Financial Disputes Mediation
i.

Overview

The Financial Disputes Mediation (“FDM”) is an alternative dispute resolution in
which financial consumers can seek a monetary remedy for the allegedly illegal and
abusive activities of financial institutions by requesting mediation to the FSS.

The FDM

aims to use expertise and organization to overcome the disadvantages that occur when
financial consumers try to resolve disputes against financial institutions, and to relieve
financial consumers of the significant cost and time burden of private litigation.18

The

FSS has taken charge of FDM cases since its establishment in 1999,19 and has a ‘Dispute

18

FSS, Geumyungsobijaboho Baegseo [A White Paper on Financial Consumer Protection], 325 (April 2011).

19

The FSS was established in January 1999 by consolidating four financial supervisory bodies, which were
10

Settlement Department’ within the agency to deal with FDM cases effectively. 20

The

FDM was established in the “Act on the Establishment, etc. of Financial Services
Commission.”21

The FSS enacted the “Detailed Regulations on Mediation of Financial

Disputes” (hereinafter “Detailed Regulations on FDM”) to prescribe procedures for the
FDM and the operation of the Financial Disputes Mediation Committee (“FDMC”).

ii.

FDM process

The FDM process is generally initiated by filing an application for mediation after
a dispute concerning financial matters arises between financial consumers and financial
institutions. 22

Financial consumers, financial institutions, and other interested parties

may file an application for mediation with the FSS. Applications may be filed jointly,
and an appointed representative may perform all acts concerning a case for applicants who

the Office of Bank Supervision (OBS), the Securities Supervisory Board (SSB), the Insurance Supervisory
Board (ISB), and the Non-bank Supervisory Authority (NSA), into a single supervisory organization. As a
result, dispute mediation, which had been performed by OBS, SSB, and ISB respectively, was replaced by
the FDM of the FSS. See FSS HANDBOOK, supra note 13 at 12.
20

The Dispute Settlement Department is made up of five teams, which are divided by types of financial
products such as banking, insurance, and securities. Approximately forty staff members including lawyers
review the FDM cases and support the FDMC. For the organization and functions of the Dispute Settlement
Department, see FSS website, Organization Chart & Department Guide, available at
http://www.fss.or.kr/fss/kr/about/fss/board_list.jsp?p_buso=208203000 (last visited on May 18, 2015).
21

See Act on the Establishment, etc. of Financial Services Commission § 5.

Financial disputes are defined as “disputes filed against finance-related agencies by other finance-related
agencies, financial consumers, such as depositors or such, and other interested parties, as the rights and duties
or interests arise in connection with financial services, etc. of finance-related agencies.” See Detailed
Regulations on FDM § 5(3). Here, finance-related agencies mean financial institutions subject to
examination by the FSS. These include banks, non-bank financial institutions, securities-related companies,
insurance companies, the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation, the National Federation of Fisheries
Cooperatives, and others. See Detailed Regulations on FDM § 3(4).
22

11

have selected their representative.23
After receiving an application for the FDM, the Disputes Settlement Department
reviews the case and proceeds with discovery to verify the facts concerning the disputes.24
Unless the case is directly settled by the FSS,25 the FSS refers the case to the FDMC.26
The FDMC deliberates on a case within sixty days from the date when the case was referred
to it, and makes either a mediation decision or decision of dismissal.27

When the FDMC

has made a decision, it prepares a written mediation decision or decision of dismissal, and
notifies the Governor of the FSS of the results.28

Unless the Governor of the FSS requests

the FDMC to reconsider the case,29 the FSS notifies the parties of a written decision of the

23

Detailed Regulations on FDM § 12.

24

The Department may make an inquiry into, or request attendance of, related persons in connection with
the case. If deemed necessary, it may perform on-site examinations or request to examine specific
departments. See Detailed Regulations on FDM § 16.
25

In cases where details of an application fall under any of subparagraphs enlisted in § 17(1) of the Detailed
Regulations on FDM, the FSS may directly settle an application for mediation without reference to the FDMC,
or transmit it to the relevant agency to settle it. For example, when the case has already been brought before
the court or a lawsuit has been instituted after an application for mediation was made, the FSS may directly
settle the case.
26

The FDMC is composed of thirty members or less, headed by the Deputy Governor of the FSS. The
FDMC members are appointed by the Governor of the FSS among assistant governors of the FSS, and are
persons who have expertise and experience in law, finance, consumer protection, medical science, etc.
Every meeting of the FDMC is comprised of no less than 7 members and not more than 11 members appointed
by the Chairperson by not later than one week prior to a meeting, and convened by the Chairperson. A
decision of the FDMC is made by a majority of members present at the meeting at which a quorum is present.
For composition and operation of the FDMC, see Detailed Regulations on FDM Chap. II.
27

Detailed Regulations on FDM § 25(1).

28

Detailed Regulations on FDM § 26.

29

For cases where the Governor may request reconsideration, see Detailed Regulations on FDM § 27(1).
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FDMC.30
Acceptance of the mediation terms proposed by the FSS is entirely voluntary, and
either party may reject the proposal and seek legal remedies through the court system.31
Once both parties accept the proposal, such acceptance has the same effect as a judicial
settlement.32

Thus, both parties are bound by the terms of the mediation and are not

allowed to further dispute the case in litigation.

If the FDMC deems that the measures

taken by a financial institution are remarkably unjust, the FSS may provide support to an
applicant in a lawsuit by request of the FDMC.33
Figure 1.

FINANCIAL DISPUTES MEDIATION PROCEDURE34

30

Detailed Regulations on FDM § 28.

31

FSS HANDBOOK, supra note 13 at 148.

32

Act on the Establishment, etc. of Financial Services Commission § 55.

33

Detailed Regulations on FDM § 32-2. Under this program, which was initiated in 2002, the FSS may
support an applicant’s lawsuit against a financial institution by appointing an attorney and paying the
attorney’s fee at its own expense.
34

FSS HANDBOOK, supra note 13 at 150.
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iii.

FDM cases filed in the FSS

Based on recent four-year statistics related to the FDM, more than 25,000 cases
were filed annually in the FSS for mediation.

The majority of the cases concerned

insurance, comprising approximately three quarters of the total, followed by banking &
non-banking, and then securities, except in 2013, which reflected securities investors’
massive applications to the FDM after the Tong Yang Crisis. 35

According to FDM

statistics, 45.4 percent of cases among the total FDM filings during 2010 were decided in
favor of the applicant.36
Table 1. NUMBER OF THE FDM CASES FILED IN THE FSS37
2010
2011
2012
Banking & Non-banking
4,351
10,036
6,955
Securities
788
763
442
Insurance
20,749
22,654
21,159
Total
25,888
33,453
28,556

2013
6,163
18,394
20,247
44,804

35

In the aftermath of the Tong Yang affair, investors began to file for the FDM against Tong Yang Securities
Company from October, 2013, alleging that the company intentionally did not explain properly and
sufficiently the risks related to the investment to investors and recommended the securities indiscriminately
without considering investor’s experience and knowledge in order to promote sales of its affiliates’ securities,
which resulted in widespread damages. As of July 2014, approximately 22,000 investors filed a case. PRESS
RELEASE ON TONG YANG MEDIATION, supra note 1, at 1.
This rate, which is called the “acceptance rate”, is calculated by dividing the number of cases that the FSS
accepts by the total number of cases completed during the year except cases withdrawn or referred to other
agencies. See Press Release, FSS, 2010nyeon Geumyungbunjaengjojeong Siljeog Mich Sojegi Hyeonhwang
[Results for Financial Disputes Mediation and Status of Subsequent Lawsuits in 2010], Jan. 31, 2011,
available
at
http://www.fss.or.kr/fss/kr/promo/bodobbs_view.jsp?seqno=14916&no=1&s_title=%BC%D2%C1%A6%B
1%E2&s_kind=title&page=1 (last visited on May 18, 2015).
36

37

FSS,
FSS
website:
Financial
Disputes
Statistics,
available
at
http://consumer.fss.or.kr/fss/consumer/minwonetc/bbs/list.jsp?bbsid=1329181518731&url=/fss/cm/132918
1518731 (last visited on May 18, 2015) (providing the FDM statistics periodically). In this table, nonbanking institutions include mutual savings banks, credit-specialized financial institutions (i.e. credit card
companies, lease companies), credit unions, etc.
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2. Refund of Damages Incurred by Phishing Frauds
i.

Overview

A few years ago, the National Assembly authorized financial regulators to perform
a new compensatory role. The National Assembly established the ‘Special Act on the
Refund of Damages Incurred from Telecommunication Financial Fraud’ (hereinafter
“Special Act”) in 201138 to relieve financial consumers’ damages from increased phishing
fraud.39

Before the enactment of the Special Act, a victim of phishing fraud had to file a

civil suit against the account owner who had transferred the victim’s money in order to
recover the balance remaining in the account.40

That is, even though a balance remained

38

As the act was amended to enhance the responsibilities of financial institutions and regulatory authorities
for the prevention of phishing fraud, it was renamed as the Special Act on Prevention of Telecommunication
Financial Fraud and the Damage Refund [hereinafter “Renewed Special Act”] in July 2014.
39

Phishing fraud is a specific kind of fraud crime to swindle money out of victims through non-face-to-face
transactions using telecommunication financial means. One of the most well-known phishing frauds is voice
phishing, which induces victims to transfer money by deceiving them or draws money from the victim’
account by using deceptively obtained financial information in the course of telephone communication.
According to the National Police Agency’s statistic, the number of occurrences of phishing fraud and the
amount of damages kept increasing until 2011 when the Special Act was established, and they reached their
peak in 2011, which amounted to 8,244 cases and 102 billion won respectively. See Boiseupising Jikimi
[Voice Phishing Keeper], Overview of Phishing Fraud, available at http://phishingkeeper.fss.or.kr/fss/vstop/guide/define.jsp (last visited on May 18, 2015) (website designed to provide the
public with information on preventive measures against phishing fraud and refund of damages).
40

In phishing crime, it is generally known that once a victim remits money to the account employed in the
fraud, a defrauder draws money from the account within 5 minutes from the time deposited. Thus, when a
victim requests a bank to suspend payment, it is likely that the money that a victim has sent would be already
drawn out. However, since monies are deposited from many different victims in the account, there is a
possibility that the account retains a certain level of balance at the time of suspension. Moreover, such
possibility has increased due to a new delayed withdrawal system, which was initiated in 2012 in order to
raise effectiveness of suspension of payment for the account employed in the fraud by delaying the time
required to withdraw. Under the new system, cash withdrawals of three million won or more is not possible
until at least 10 minutes after the money has been wired. Press Release, FSS, '12.6.26Il (Hwa) Buteo
Jiyeoninchuljedo Sihaeng [Delayed Withdrawal System Will Be Initiated from June 26, 2012], June 11, 2012,
available
at
http://www.fss.or.kr/fss/kr/promo/bodobbs_view.jsp?seqno=15980&no=1&s_title=%C1%F6%BF%AC%C
0%CE%C3%E2%C1%A6%B5%B5&s_kind=title&page=1 (last visited on May 18, 2015).
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in the account employed in the fraud after a bank suspended payment from the account as
requested by the victim or other authorities to prevent defrauders from drawing money, a
bank may not return the money to the victims unless the account owner agrees or another
relevant legal measure is issued, such as a court order.41

Therefore, many victims gave

up trying to recover damages from the balance remaining in the account because of the
time and cost required to bring a lawsuit, especially considering the relatively small
amounts of money that they may recover.42

However, the Special Act enabled victims to

recover their damages up to the balance remaining in the account used in the phishing fraud
by administrative procedures without proceeding with a formal lawsuit.

ii.

Process for the damage refund

The process for a damage refund is initiated with a victim’s application to the bank
that manages the victim’s account or an account used in the phishing fraud.43

By a victims’

request, the bank immediately suspends payment from the account for the entire balance.44

41

For civil remedies available to victims of voice phishing, see generally, Tae Seok Roh & Sung Woo Lee,
A Study on Civil Remedies for Victims of Voice Phishing, 10-1 KOREAN J. FIN. L. 383, 392-93 (2013).
42

According to the recent analysis conducted by the FSS, the average amount of damage per phishing fraud
case is approximately 11.3 million won. Press Release, FSS, Pisingsagineun 30dae Yeoseong,
Daechulsagineun 40dae Namseongeseo Manhi Balsaeng [Men in 30s Are Most Vulnerable to Phishing Fraud,
Women in 40s to Phone Loan Fraud], 1, 2, Nov. 12, 2014, available at
http://www.fss.or.kr/fss/kr/promo/bodobbs_view.jsp?seqno=18195&no=10967&s_title=&s_kind=&page=4
(last visited on May 18, 2015). However, it is predicted that victims may recover, on average, 20 percent of
damages incurred, considering that the damage refund rate by the Special Act was approximately 20 percent
in 2012, the year after the act was initiated. Id. at 10. Therefore, if the account balance at the time of
suspension of payment is not sufficient to recover damages, a victim may not choose to bring a lawsuit
because it is not economically feasible.
43

Renewed Special Act § 3.

44

Renewed Special Act § 4.
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After the suspension of payment, the bank requests the FSS to announce commencement
of a procedure terminating an account holder’s right over the deposit balance, and the FSS
posts an announcement. 45

If no appeal is raised after two months from the date of

announcement, the right over the account balance is finally terminated.46

Within fourteen

days after termination, the FSS decides the refund amount distributed to each victim who
remitted the money to the account.47

In 2011, the FSS established a new team within the

Micro-finance Support Department, which is exclusively responsible for refunding
damages, educating the public on how to prevent phishing fraud, and publicizing the
damage refund system.

iii.

Refund amount

The damage refund system greatly contributed to the recovery of victims’ damages
without additional cost and effort.

The FSS has assisted fraud victims to recover over 50

billion won, which they otherwise might have relinquished.
Table 2. DAMAGE REFUND BY YEAR48
Damage Refund
Cases
Amount (billion won)
Refund Rate (percent)

45

Renewed Special Act § 5.

46

Renewed Special Act § 9.

47

Renewed Special Act § 10.

2012
26,002
27.2
20.1

48

2013
21,918
15.6
14.6

2014.1-6
14,635
11.2
11.9

Press Release, FSS, Boiseupising, Dasi Jeungga [Rebound of Voice Phishing Cases], 1, 2, available at
http://www.fss.or.kr/fss/kr/promo/bodobbs_view.jsp?seqno=18089&no=24&s_title=%BA%B8%C0%CC%
BD%BA%C7%C7%BD%CC&s_kind=title&page=1 (last visited on May 18, 2015). As shown in the table,
the refund rate has consistently decreased since 2012. For this reason, the FSS explained that the withdrawal
of money from the account is much faster, while it takes longer for a victim to recognize phishing fraud as
the methods of scamming are more skillful and diversified. Id. at 2.
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3. Limitations of Current Compensatory Schemes

Even though both the traditional FDM and recent damage refund system
compensated financial consumers’ damages incurred by illegal or unjust conduct in the
financial markets, they have some limitations as compensation schemes exercised by the
financial regulators.

Generally speaking, the current schemes are not appropriate for

compensating massive monetary harms incurred by the violation of financial laws that the
regulators are responsible for overseeing and sanctioning.

i.

FDM

The first limitation is that the regulator cannot compel both parties to follow the
mediation decision. That is, the mediation only comes into effect if both parties accept
the FDMC’s decision.

Therefore, even if a financial consumer is satisfied with the

decision, he or she must assume the risk of undertaking a formal proceeding if a financial
institution rejects it. 49

Second, the FDM cannot proceed in cases where a financial

institution files a lawsuit in a court after the application for the FDM is filed.50

In some

cases, financial institutions are thought to intentionally take legal actions to avoid the FDM
process and improve their negotiating position.51

Third, the FDM only covers disputes

49

Specifically, the acceptance rate of the FDM is relatively low in securities-related disputes because, in
many cases, final responsibility of a case is imputed to employees of a securities company. Young-Hoa Son,
A Rational Improvement Idea of the Finance Dispute Mediation System, 11-3 BEOBGWAJEONGCHAEGYEONGU
[L. & POL. STUDY] 929, 954 (2011).
50

Detailed Regulations on FDM § 17(1)(1).

51

Of the 28,988 FDM cases filed in 2009, 1,656 cases, or 5.7 percent, were followed by civil suits.
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Of

with financial institutions.

Thus, it is not applicable for issuers and individuals (e.g.,

officials, employees, etc.) that violate securities laws, such as fraudulent misrepresentation
on disclosure documents.

And even if a financial institution is related to the dispute, it is

unlikely that the case is dealt with through FDM if it requires an extensive investigation or
is not directly related to the sale of financial instruments.52

Fourth, current FDM is more

appropriate for resolving disputes involving one or a small number of financial consumers.
Under the current system, mediation binds only the parties involved in the process, and has
no effect on persons who did not participate in the mediation.53

Therefore, the FDM may

not be appropriate in cases where a large number of victims suffer the same or similar
damage by a financial law violation such as securities fraud.

ii.

Damage Refund System

The damage refund system for phishing fraud reflects a more active role by
financial regulators in that the system allows victims to directly recover their monetary
damage in place of private litigation. However, this system is designed under the specific

these cases, 1,435 cases, or 86.7 percent, were raised by financial institutions. Press Release, FSS,
2009nyeondo Geumyungbunjaengjojeong Sincheonggwanlyeon Sosongjegi Hyeonhwang [Lawsuits
Followed by Application of the Financial Disputes Mediation in 2009], March 12, 2010, available at
http://www.fss.or.kr/fss/kr/promo/bodobbs_view.jsp?seqno=14232&no=14&s_title=%BC%D2%BC%DB&
s_kind=title&page=2 (last visited on May 18, 2015).
52

See Detailed Regulations on FDM § 17(1)(9).. For instance, if a securities company is negligent for a
misleading registration statement, injured investors may not invoke the FDM process to seek compensation.
Recently, some Congressmen proposed a bill to introduce “collective disputes mediation” in FDM cases,
which allows victims not participating in the mediation procedure to receive damages after the mediation for
the purpose of expediting compensation to victims of major financial scandals. See National Policy
Committee, Geumyungwiwonhoeui seolchideunge gwanhan beoblyul ilbugaejeongbeoblyulan
geomtobogoseo [Review on the amendment of the Act on the Establishment, etc. of Financial Services
Commission] (Nov. 2014).
53
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circumstance of phishing fraud, and is unlikely to extend to compensation schemes for
other types of violations that occur in the financial markets.

More importantly, phishing

fraud is basically a matter belonging to the sphere of criminal law rather than financial
regulation. Therefore, it seems strange that financial regulators play a compensatory role
on matters over which they have no authority to regulate.

20

III. Overview of the SEC’s Disgorgement and Civil Monetary Penalty

When the SEC was created in 1934, the agency’s statutory remedy for securities
violations was primarily to seek injunctive relief.

It is relatively recent in the SEC’s

history that the agency has authority to seek disgorgement and civil monetary penalties in
federal securities law violations, and to distribute funds collected from the violators to
defrauded investors.

This Part provides a brief overview of the history of the SEC’s

authority of disgorgement and civil monetary penalties, and the distinction between civil
and criminal monetary penalties.

A. Disgorgement
Disgorgement is an equitable remedy designed to deprive a wrongdoer of ill-gotten
gains and to deter others from violating the securities law.

The SEC did not have express

authority to seek disgorgement in federal securities law violations before the Securities
Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990 was enacted in 1990. 54
Absent specific statutory authority to seek a monetary remedy, the SEC relied on the court’s
general equity powers to grant “ancillary relief” to bolster its enforcement remedy. 55
Insider trading cases gave the SEC the opportunity to seek disgorgement because they
involved “identifiable gains from illegal conduct and it was necessary to deter future

54

Pub. L. No. 101-429, 104 Stat. 931 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) [hereinafter
“Remedies Act”].
55

See generally, George W. Dent Jr., Ancillary Relief in Federal Securities Law: A Study in Federal Remedies,
67 MINN. L. REV. 865 (1983); John D. Ellsworth, Disgorgement in Securities Fraud Actions Brought by the
SEC, 1977 DUKE L.J. 641 (1977); James R. Farrand, Ancillary Remedies in SEC Civil Enforcement Suits, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1779 (1976).
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violations.” 56

In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 57 an appellate court recognized the

disgorgement remedy and affirmed the district courts’ order directing corporate insiders to
disgorge their illegal profits obtained by material nonpublic information.58

Further, the

court in SEC v. First City Financial Corp., Ltd. 59 expanded the application of the
disgorgement remedy on securities law violations beyond insider trading by directing
defendants to disgorge illegal profits that resulted from a violation of section 13(d) of the
Exchange Act. 60

Thereafter, in the Remedies Act of 1990, Congress gave the SEC

express authority to order disgorgement in administrative proceedings.61

The Remedies

Act also authorized the SEC to adopt rules concerning payments to investors and other

56

Barbara Black, Should the SEC Be a Collection Agency for Defrauded Investors?, 63 BUS. LAW. 317, 320
(2008).
57

446 F.2d. 1301 (2d Cir. 1971).

In Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., the Second Circuit stated that “the SEC may seek other than injunctive relief
in order to effectuate the purposes of the [Securities Exchange] Act, so long as such relief is remedial relief
and is not a penalty assessment.” It further stated that “[r]estitution of the profits on these transactions
merely deprives the appellants of the gains of their wrongful conduct. Nor does restitution impose a hardship
in this case.” Id. at 1308. Even though courts at times use “disgorgement” and “restitution” interchangeably,
the SEC drew the line between them as follows: “Restitution is intended to make investors whole, and
disgorgement is meant to deprive the wrongdoer of their ill-gotten gain.” U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 308(C) OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, at 3, note 2 [HEREINAFTER
“SEC 308(C) REPORT”], available at https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/sox308creport.pdf (last visited on
May 18, 2015).
58

59

890 F.2d 1215 (D.C. Cir. 1989).

In this case, appellants sought to distinguish section 13(d) violations as a “technical transgression” of
reporting rules unlike insider trading. However, the court noted that “section 13(d) is a crucial requirement
in the congressional scheme, and a violator, it is legislatively assumed, improperly benefits by purchasing
stocks at an artificially low price because of a breach of the duty Congress imposed to disclose his investment
position.” The court also stated that “[w]e therefore see no relevant distinction between disgorgement of
inside trading profits and disgorgement of post-section 13(d) violation profits.” Id. at 1230.
60

The Act’s legislative history clearly showed that Congress was aware that disgorgement was already
available in judicial proceedings. Black, supra note 56, at 321 (citing S. REP. No. 101-337, at 8 (1990)).
61
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matters the agency deems necessary to implement the disgorgement provision.62

And

then, SOX gave the SEC express authority to seek equitable remedies in the federal district
court.63
Even though disgorgement funds, if economically feasible,64 are returned to the
injured investors, the courts and SEC did not view disgorgement as a means of
compensating investors, but as an enforcement remedy. Courts often stated that “[t]he
primary purpose of disgorgement is not to compensate investors,” and “[u]nlike damages,
it is a method of forcing a defendant to give up the amount by which he was unjustly
enriched.”65

Moreover, disgorgement may not be viewed as a penalty assessment.

The

court in SEC v. Blatt held that “[t]he court’s power to order disgorgement extends only to
the amount with interest by which the defendant profited from his wrongdoing.” 66
Meanwhile, in connection with measuring disgorgement, the courts do not require the SEC

62

Remedies Act, supra note 54, §§ 202(a), 203, 104 Stat. at 937-40 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-2(e), 78u3(e) (2000)).
63

Section 21(d)(5) of the Exchange Act (codified at 15 U.S.C. §78u(d)(5)).

64

As the SEC noted in its study, payment to investors is not always economically feasible. In cases where
funds are too small, or the number of identifiable investors are too large to justify a distribution, the SEC
routinely asked the court to direct that disgorged funds be paid to the U.S. Treasury. SEC 308(C) REPORT,
supra note 58, at 14.
65

E.g., SEC v. Cavanagh, 445 F.3d 105, 117 (2d Cir. 2006); SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574
F.2d 90, 102 (1978). Similarly, the SEC also stated that “[i]n contrast to actions for restitution or damages in
private actions, which are brought to compensate fraud victims for losses, disgorgement orders require
defendants to give up the amount by which they were unjustly enriched.” SEC 308(C) REPORT, supra note 58,
at 3.
66

583 F.2d 1325, 1335 (5th Cir. 1978); see also SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1104
(2d Cir. 1972) (stating that “ordering the disgorging of profits and income earned on the proceeds is in fact a
penalty assessment.”); Ellsworth, supra note 55, at 652-56.
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to prove the precise amount of the ill-gotten gains.

Rather, “disgorgement need only be a

reasonable approximation of profits casually connected to the violation.”67
Prior to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, even though the SEC obtained
disgorgement orders in various types of enforcement actions, the agency most commonly
sought disgorgements in insider trading cases where individuals made “identifiable profits”
and securities offering frauds and Ponzi schemes where the entity did not have an actual
business purpose.68

Significantly, the SEC did not seek disgorgement from a corporation

in cases where it did not sell securities by releasing materially misleading information into
the market, even though the corporation benefited from increased market capitalization or
improper accounting practices. 69

The reason for not ordering disgorgement by the

corporation in such a situation is because it would harm innocent shareholders who did not
benefit from the fraud.70

However, even where a corporation sold its securities whose

value had been inflated by disclosing misleading statements, the SEC often sought
disgorgement only from insiders who had profited from the fraud. 71

To prevent

defendants from dissipating the ill-gotten gains and to facilitate the collection of

67

SEC v. First City Financial Corp., Ltd., 890 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1989).

68

Urska Velikonja, Public Compensation for Private Harm: Evidence from the SEC's Fair Fund
Distributions, 67 STAN. L. REV. 331, 341 (2015).
69

Black, supra note 56, at 321-22.

70

Id. at 322.

71

Id.
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disgorgement, especially in cases involving Ponzi schemes, the SEC routinely sought
emergency actions such as a temporary restraining order and an asset freeze.72

B. Civil Monetary Penalty
The SEC has broad authority to seek civil monetary penalties against defendants in
cases involving federal securities law violations.

Just like disgorgement, insider trading

was the “impetus” for the agency’s civil penalty power.73

In 1984, Congress first gave

the SEC authority to seek civil monetary penalties in insider trading cases by enacting the
Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 (“ITSA”).74

The Act authorizes the SEC to seek a

civil penalty in a U.S. district court if it believes that any person has bought or sold a
security while in possession of material nonpublic information.75

It also provides that the

penalty may be up to three times the amount of profit gained or loss avoided from insider
trading. 76

Four years later, Congress again expanded the scope of civil penalties to

controlling persons in the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988
(“ITSFEA”).77

Finally, the Remedies Act enacted in 1990 grants the SEC the power to

bring an action in federal district court to seek civil penalties against any defendant for any

72

See SEC 308(C) REPORT, supra note 58, at 9.

73

Black, supra note 56, at 323.

74

Pub L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1).

75

Exchange Act § 21A(a)(1) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(a)(1)).

76

Exchange Act § 21A(a)(2) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(a)(2)).

77

Pub L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1).
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securities law violations.78

The Act also allows the SEC to assess civil monetary penalties

in an administrative forum against certain securities professionals such as broker-dealers,
investment advisers, and their associated personnel.79

Further, Congress authorized the

SEC to impose civil monetary penalties on “any” person or entity in cease-and-desist
proceedings by enacting the Dodd-Frank Act.80
The Remedies Act provides that the penalty amount is determined by a three-tiers
system, depending on the seriousness of the violation.81

Even though each tier limits the

maximum dollar amount, adjusted for inflation,82 the amount of the penalty may equal the
“gross amount of pecuniary gain” to the defendant as a result of the violation if it exceeds
the monetary cap.83

This enables the SEC to impose a civil penalty that equals the amount

of disgorgement, “doubling the total monetary sanction against the defendant.” 84
Moreover, since the term “violation” is not defined in the Act, the SEC may multiply the
maximum amount of the penalty by the number of individual violations, “particularly in
the typical financial fraud situation where many defendants have made numerous

78

Pub L. No. 101-429, 104 Stat. 931 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).

79

E.g. section 21B(a)(1) of the Exchange Act (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 78u-2(a)(1)).

80

Pub L. No. 111-203, § 929P, 124 Stat. 1376, 1862 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 78u-2(a)(2)).

81

Securities Act § 20(d) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77t); Exchange Act § 21(d) (codified as
amended at § 78u(d)).
82

According to the most recent inflation adjustment, the maximum amount of penalty per violation is
$160,000 for natural persons and $775,000 for any other person. Adjustments to Civil Monetary Penalty
Amounts, 78 Fed. Reg. 14179 (March 5, 2013).
83

Securities Act § 20(d); Exchange Act § 21(d).

84

Velikonja, supra note 67, at 360.
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misstatements that allegedly violate a number of different statutory provisions.”85

Prior

to the SOX, when the SEC collected a penalty it was remitted to the U.S. Treasury.
However, this changed after the creation of section 308(c) of the SOX; this will be further
discussed in Part IV.

C. Two-Track System: civil and criminal monetary penalties
Meanwhile, the SEC’s new ability to seek civil monetary penalties in its
enforcement actions raised critical questions about the implication for criminal monetary
penalties.

In many federal securities law violation cases, the SEC and criminal authorities

such as the U.S. Attorney’s Office and FBI jointly investigate and bring separate actions
for the same offense as provided in the securities laws.86

The Supreme Court in Standard

Sanitary Manufacturing Co. v. United States held it constitutional for the government to
initiate parallel civil and criminal proceedings.87

Accordingly, violators of securities laws

may have to pay both the civil monetary penalty charged by the SEC and the criminal fine
by the U.S. Attorney.
As it becomes more common for administrative agencies to seek civil monetary
penalties, the conventional distinction of labeling civil law as “remedy” and criminal law

Black, supra note 56, at 325 n 58 (citing, for example, SEC v. Haligiannis, which stated that “each of the
quarterly statements sent to each of the investors is a materially false statement that technically constitutes a
separate violation.”).
85

86

For example, Section 21 and 21A of the Exchange Act provide civil penalties initiated by the SEC and
Section 32 of the Exchange Act provides criminal penalties.
226 U.S. 20, 52 (1912) (stating that “[t]he Sherman Act provides for a criminal proceeding to punish
violations and suits in equity to restrain such violations, and the suits may be brought simultaneously or
successively.”), cited in SEC v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 628 F.2d 1368, 1374 (1980).
87
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as “punishment,” no longer seems appropriate.88

When Congress authorized the SEC to

seek civil monetary penalties in insider trading cases in 1984, it did not define them as
either a “remedy,” or “punishment.”89
“deterrence.”90

Instead, Congress explicitly stated its aim to be

Interestingly, deterrence is traditionally regarded as an objective of the

criminal law system.91

However, as one commentator has pointed out, “when it comes to

deterrence, civil and criminal remedies are essentially indistinguishable and
interchangeable.”92 Thus, to impose two monetary sanctions, which have different labels
but seem to serve similar purposes, against the same offense raises the question of whether
it would constitute double jeopardy.

However, in Hudson v. United States, the Supreme

Court held that the monetary penalties and occupational debarment sanctions imposed by
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) did not bar subsequent criminal
proceedings against the petitioners for the same misconduct, because the OCC's

88

For discussions on civil and criminal law distinction, see generally, Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil
Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1803-10 (1992); Mary
M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding
and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42 Hastings L.J. 1325, 1348-69 (1991).
One commentator explained that legislatures and courts avoided labeling them as “punitive” to circumvent
the application of criminal-type procedural rules. Mann, supra note 88, at 1801.
89

90

The House Report stated:
The principal, and often effectively only, remedy available to the Commission against insider trading
is an injunction against further violations of the securities laws and disgorgement of illicit profits…
[These] serve[ ] only a remedial function and [do] not penalize a defendant for the illegal conduct…
The Committee believes the new penalty provided by the legislation will serve as a powerful deterrent
to insider trading abuses." H.R. Rep. No. 355, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1984), reprinted in
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274, 2281.

91

E.g. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963) (describing the traditional aims of
punishment as “retribution and deterrence”).
92

Cheh, supra note 88, at 1355.
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administrative proceedings were civil, not criminal, actions for the purposes of the double
jeopardy clause.93

The Supreme Court reasoned that Congress had intended that such

sanctions imposed by the OCC be “civil in nature,” and there was little evidence to suggest
that those sanctions were “so punitive in form and effect as to render them criminal despite
Congress’ intent to the contrary.”94

The Court further stated that “[t]o hold that the mere

presence of a deterrent purpose renders such sanctions “criminal” for double jeopardy
purposes would severely undermine the Government's ability to engage in effective
regulation of institutions such as banks.”95
Even though the SEC can bring actions for civil monetary penalties without much
concern about compromising a parallel criminal prosecution for the same conduct, 96 the
following questions still remain: Why does the SEC need to seek monetary penalties
despite the availability of criminal penalties?

Do civil monetary penalties have a greater

deterrence effect on securities law violations than criminal penalties?

Such questions

may be better answered by examining the practical aspects of civil and criminal
enforcement actions.

93

522 U.S. 93 (1997). In this case, the Supreme Court largely disavowed the method of analysis used in
United States v Halper, in which the Supreme Court had previously ruled that “a civil sanction that cannot
fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either
retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment” for the purposes of the double jeopardy analysis. 490 US
435, 448 (1989). Instead, the Court reaffirmed the previously established rule exemplified in United States v.
Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980).
94

Id. at 103-104.

95

Id. at 105.

Thomas C. Newkirk, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech by SEC Staff: The Advantage of a Dual System:
Parallel Streams of Civil and Criminal Enforcement of the U.S. Securities Laws, Remarked by 16th
International
Symposium
on
Economic
Crime
(Sep.
19,
1998),
available
at
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch222.htm (last visited on May 18, 2015).
96
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Civil and criminal law enforcement actions differ in terms of the investigation and
procedure as well as the available remedies. 97

Even though criminal authorities have

more powers of investigation than civil authorities,98 once a case has been filed, the civil
case allows the government much more “leeway” to get at the facts and prove its case.99
In criminal cases, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and a defendant’s Fifth
Amendment right substantially limit the prosecution’s discovery during the criminal
proceeding. Most importantly, the prosecution must prove each element of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.

Conversely, in civil cases, discovery rules under the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure allow for more pre-trial gathering of evidence, and a defendant’s
refusal to testify allows the trier of fact to draw adverse inferences from such silence.
Further, a civil proceeding generally requires a lower burden of proof—a preponderance
of the evidence.
Such restrictions in a criminal procedure make successful prosecution difficult in
complex or subtler violations such as securities fraud, increasing the risk that the wrongful
conduct may not be sufficiently punished and deterred. 100

To avoid such difficulties,

lawmakers and law enforcement have increasingly relied on civil penalties to assure

97

Id. at IV. Practical Differences.

98

For example, unlike criminal authorities, under the Privacy Act of 1974, a federal agency cannot solicit
information from an individual without first identifying himself and explaining the purpose of his inquiry.
See generally, § 5 U.S.C. 552a.
99

Id.

Robert H. Jackson, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 152 (Vintage ed. 1941) (stating that “the
criminal law has long proved futile to reach the subtler kinds of fraud at all, and [is] able to reach grosser
fraud, only rarely.”) (cited in Robert G. Blakey & Scott D. Cessar, Equitable Relief Under Civil RICO:
Reflections on Religious Technology Center v. Wollersheim: Will Civil RICO Be Effective Only Against WhiteCollar Crime?, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 526, 568, n 191(1987)).
100
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compliance with the law, even when criminal penalties are available. Civil penalties are
not only “easier and faster” to implement, but are also regarded as being “more effective
in deterring crime in particular instances.” 101

Thus, even though the criminal penalty

system might fail to bring a criminal to justice, the civil penalty system operates as a last
resort for correction and deterrence.102

Further, the existence of the civil system allows

the criminal authorities to focus on the most egregious cases.103

Peter Finn & Maria O’Brien Hylton, U.S. Dep't of Justice, National Institute of Justice, Using Civil
Remedies for Criminal Behavior: Rationale, Case Studies, and Constitutional Issues, 1, 2, (Oct. 1994)
available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/151757NCJRS.pdf (last visited on May 18, 2015);
Cheh, supra note 88, at 1329.
101

102

Newkirk, supra note 96, at VIII, Parallel Proceedings: The Two Tracks.

103

Id. at X, Conclusion.
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IV. Review of the SEC’s Fair Fund

A. Overview
The Fair Fund provision was included in Section 308 of the SOX, which was
enacted in the wake of corporate accounting scandals that caused significant losses to
investors in the securities markets.

As previously stated, even before its enactment, the

SEC could seek disgorgement against securities law violators in judicial or administrative
proceedings and distribute collected monies to defrauded investors.

During this period,

the SEC typically tried to disgorge illegal profits from insiders who benefited from an
issuer’s misrepresentation, and corporate issuers who defrauded investors without any
substantial business operation (known as a “Ponzi scheme”) in the securities markets.104
However, distribution of disgorgement funds during this time was not very impressive.
According to the SEC’s study, the agency distributed a little over one billion dollars to
approximately 125,000 investors in thirty-four district court cases between 1997 and
2002.105
Although the legislative history does not make clear what exactly Congress
intended with the Fair Fund provision,106 it allowed the SEC to expand its compensation

104

Id. at 321-22.

105

See SEC 308(C) REPORT, supra note 58, at 10. During the same period, the SEC distributed or proposed
to distribute funds in 16 administrative proceedings, but the total amount and number of investors distributed
was not shown in this study. Id. at 15.
106

Professor Black explained the reason why the legislative history of SOX is absent as follows:
While the Senate-passed bill that was the source for most provisions of SOX did not include a
comparable provision, the House members of the SOX Conference Committee added section 308
in the joint House-Senate negotiations that produced the final legislation. The Conference
Committee did not produce a report on the legislation, and SOX was adopted virtually without
debate. See Black, supra note 56, at 326.
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power by providing the agency with an additional source for distribution to harmed
investors, that is, civil penalties which previously remitted to the U.S. Treasury. 107

With

the Fair Fund provision, the SEC has “greater flexibility” to establish a compensation fund
because the SEC may create a Fair Fund by imposing civil penalties even in situations
where it cannot seek disgorgement from the defendants. 108

Moreover, the SEC was

recently authorized to seek civil monetary penalties against any person or entity in ceaseand-desist proceedings, not just SEC-regulated persons and entities such as broker-dealers,
and investment advisers.109

107

Section 308(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. § 7246(a)) provides:
If, in any judicial or administrative action brought by the Commission under the securities laws,
the Commission obtains a civil penalty against any person for a violation of such laws, or such
person agrees, in settlement of any such action, to such civil penalty, the amount of such civil
penalty shall, on the motion or at the direction of the Commission, be added to and become part
of a disgorgement fund or other fund established for the benefit of the victims of such violation.
(Emphasis added).

Section 21(d)(3)(C)(i) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)(c)(i)) also provides:
A penalty imposed under this section shall be payable into the Treasury of the United States,
except as otherwise provided in section 308 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and Section 21F
of this title.
See SEC 308(C) REPORT, supra note 58, at 27 (stating that “[b]ecause under the Fair Fund provision, …
the Commission has greater flexibility to choose the most advantageous remedy”). When section 308(a) of
SOX was enacted, the SEC was required to order disgorgement to add amounts collected from civil penalties
to a Fair Fund. To create a Fair Fund in cases where the SEC could not show the defendant obtained illegal
profit from the securities law violation, the SEC often ordered nominal $1 as disgorgement and imposed
hundreds of millions of dollars in a civil penalty. For example, in SEC v. Lucent Technologies, the defendant
company agreed to pay a $25 million civil penalty and $1 in disgorgement. See U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, SEC AND CFTC PENALTIES: CONTINUED PROGRESS MADE IN COLLECTION
EFFORTS, BUT GREATER SEC MANAGEMENT ATTENTION IS NEEDED, 1, 28 (2005), available at
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-670 (last visited on May 18, 2015). However, this limitation was
removed by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 [hereinafter “DoddFrank Act”]. See Section 929B of Dodd–Frank Act of 2010 (15 U.S.C. § 7246(a)).
108

109

See DONNA M. NAGY, RICHARD W. PAINTER, & MARGARET V. SACHS, SECURITIES LITIGATION AND
ENFORCEMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 712 (3rd ed. 2012); see also Dodd–Frank Act of 2010 § 92P (15
U.S.C. §§ 77h-1, 78u-2).
33

From the beginning, although the SEC has discretion to create a Fair Fund, it was
eager to impose monetary sanctions and distribute them to harmed investors.” 110 From
2003, the SEC began to seek record-breaking amounts of penalties and proposed
distribution plans pursuant to the Fair Fund provision in high-profile cases such as
American International Group, Inc. ($800 million),111 Worldcom ($750 million),112 Enron
($450 million),113 Banc of America Capital Management, LLC ($375 million),114 Fannie

110

For example, the SEC announced the Fair Fund program as one of the four main objectives in 2004
(stating “wherever practical, continue to seek to return recovered funds to defrauded investors.”). See U.S.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, ANN. REP. 2003, 24 (2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/annrep03.shtml
(last visited on May 18, 2015).
American International Group, Inc. (“AIG”) settled the SEC’s charges of material misstatement of
financial statements through sham transactions and entities by agreeing to pay $700 million in disgorgement
and $100 million in penalties. See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Litigation Release No. 19560 (Feb. 9, 2006),
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr19560.htm (last visited on May 18, 2015). The
district court approved the distribution plan in April 2008. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
SEC Announces Start of Distribution Process in AIG Settlement; Court Approves Distribution Plan for $800
Million Fair Fund (May 5, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-77.htm (last visited
on May 18, 2015).
111

In this historical accounting fraud case, the SEC obtained the court’s approval of $750,000,000 in the civil
penalty settlement, which is “75 times greater than any prior settlement penalty,” and a nominal $1 in
disgorgement. SEC v. Worldcom Inc., 273 F.Supp. 2d 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). The SEC’s distribution plan
was approved by the district court in July 2004. See No. 02 Civ. 4963 (JSR), 2004 WL 1621185 (S.D.N.Y.
July 20, 2014), aff’d, 467 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2006).
112

113

The SEC took numerous enforcement actions against former Enron employees as well as other related
parties such as J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. For details on Enron-related enforcement actions by the SEC, see
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Spotlight on Enron, available at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/enron.htm (last
visited on May 18, 2015). Through these actions, the SEC collectively obtained $440 million from settling
parties. The district court approved the distribution plan in October 2008. See Enron Victim Trust official
website, FAQ1: What are the details of the SEC’s Settlement with the Settling Parties?, available at
http://www.enronvictimtrust.com/Faq.html#1 (last visited on May 18, 2015) (providing Enron investors with
information about the Fair Fund).
114

Banc of America Capital Market, LLC, BACAP Distributors, LLC, and Banc of America Securities, LLC
(“respondents”) were prosecuted by the SEC because of mutual fund market timing and late trading. In its
administrative proceeding, the SEC accepted the offers by the respondents and ordered the payment of $250
million in disgorgement and $125 million in civil penalties. See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Admin. Proc.
File No. 3-11818 (Feb. 9, 2005). The distribution plan was approved by the SEC in December 2007. See
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Order Approving the Distribution Plan, SEA Release No. 34-57048 (Dec. 27,
34

Mae ($350 million),115 and so on. However, these large penalties against corporations
raised the concern that penalties on corporations may harm shareholders who are both
victims of the violation, and ultimately bear the cost of the penalty. 116

To make clear

“when and how the Commission would use corporate penalties,” the SEC announced a new
guideline on the corporate penalty in January 2006.117

According to the guideline, the

SEC would consider two factors in deciding whether to impose a penalty on the corporation:
“The presence or absence of a direct benefit to the corporation as a result of the violation”
and “the degree to which the penalty will recompense or further harm the injured
shareholders.”118

Interestingly, as may be inferred from the second factor, it seems that

the Fair Fund provision of SOX, to some extent, justifies the SEC’s large penalties in
corporate fraud cases.

The SEC remarked that the Fair Fund provision has “the potential

2007).
The SEC and the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (“OFHEO”) settled $400 million in
civil penalties with the Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”), which made false financial
statements in violation of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”). See U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, Litigation Release No. 19710 (May 23, 2006). Among the penalties, approximately $350 million
assessed by the SEC was transferred to a Fair Fund to compensate damaged investors. The Distribution plan
was approved by the district court in April 2007. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC
Announces Start of $357 Million Fair Fund Distribution Process in Fannie Mae Settlement (April 30, 2007),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-81.htm (last visited on May 18, 2015).
115

116

Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Statement of the Securities and Exchange Commission
Concerning Financial Penalties [hereinafter “SEC PENALTY POLICY”], SEC Press Release No. 2006-4 (Jan.
4, 2006) (reviewing the Remedies Act legislative history that warned against the SEC’s use of corporate
penalty in cases where shareholders are the principal victims of the violation), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006-4.htm.
117

Id.

118

Id. (in addition to the two principal factors, the SEC listed additional considerations in the guideline.
Those include: the need to deter the particular type of offense; the extent of the injury to innocent parties;
whether complicity in the violation is widespread throughout the corporation; the level of intent on the part
of the perpetrators; the degree of difficulty in detecting the particular type of offense; presence or lack of
remedial steps by the corporations; and extent of cooperation with Commission and other law enforcement).
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to substantially mitigate the concerns” that large civil monetary penalties could do
“duplicative harm to victims of fraud” who are shareholders of the wrongdoer in corporate
fraud cases.119
Meanwhile, the SEC internally initiated several measures to improve the
management and operation of the Fair Fund.

First, in 2007, the SEC set up the newly

created Office of Collections and Distributions (“OCD”) within the Enforcement Division
to manage the collection of disgorgement and penalties, and expedite the distribution
process of a Fair Fund.120

The OCD functions as a control tower in matters with a Fair

Fund to ensure consistency among cases and standardize the distribution process. 121
Secondly, the SEC began to use a new computer tracking system called “Phoenix” in
February 2007 to efficiently manage detailed information on disgorgement and
penalties.122

The SEC also launched an inter-office “working group” in 2009 to improve

information sharing and coordination between functions on distribution plans, and to

Annette L. Nazareth, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech by SEC Commissioner: Remarks
before the ABA National Institute on Securities Fraud (Sept. 28, 2006), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2006/spch092806aln.htm (last visited on May 18, 2015).
119

U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION: INFORMATION ON
FAIR FUND COLLECTIONS AND DISTRIBUTIONS (2010), 1, 8 [hereinafter “GAO STUDY”], available at
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-448R (last visited on May 18, 2015). The SEC reorganized the
OCD into the “Office of Collections” and the “Office of Distributions” in 2012.
120

121

For example, the OCD provides guidance on developing and administering distribution plans, assigns
attorneys at headquarters to partner on Fair Fund cases, sets policies and procedures for streamlined
distribution among funds, and introduced templates for forms and documentations. Id. at 26-27.
See U.S. SEC. & EXCH, COMM’N, OFFICE OF AUDIT, EVALUATION NO. 432, OVERSIGHT OF RECEIVERS AND
DISTRIBUTION
AGENTS
1,
3
(2007),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oig/reports/audits/2007/432final.pdf (last visited on May 18, 2015). Prior
to its introduction, financial information was recorded in the Case Activity Tracking System (“CATS”).
According to the Report, “Phoenix can accommodate more detailed financial information than CATS did,
and unlike CATS, Phoenix provides an audit trail showing changes to system data.” Id.
122
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diagnose potential problems that could delay distribution.123

Lastly, the SEC adopted a

new performance metric as part of an effort to facilitate the Fair Fund distribution.
According to its 2014-2018 Strategic Plan, the new metric would measure “the percentage
of Fair Fund and disgorgement fund plans that have distributed 80 percent of the available
funds for distribution within twenty four (24) months of the approval of the distribution
plan.”124

B. Creation and Distribution of the Fair Fund
1. Creation of a Fair Fund
In enforcement actions against violators, the SEC must consider whether to create
a Fair Fund.

Although the SEC takes many factors into account when deciding whether

to create a Fair Fund,125 the final decision mainly turns on two factors: first, “whether there
is an identifiable class of victims who suffered identifiable harm,” and second, “whether
the amount of money likely to be collected from the defendant is large enough to justify a

123

See GAO STUDY, supra note 120, at 25.

See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STRATEGIC PLAN FISCAL YEAR 2014-2018, 33 (2014) [hereinafter
“2014-2018 STRATEGIC PLAN”], available at http://www.sec.gov/about/sec-strategic-plan-2014-2018.pdf
(last visited on May 18, 2015). This metric was previously defined as the “percentage of Fair Fund and
disgorgement fund plans that distributed the final tranche of funds to injured investors within 24 months of
the order appointing the fund administrator” in the 2010-2015 SEC Strategic Plan (emphasis added). The
previous Strategic Plan also measured the “percentage of Fair Fund and disgorgement fund plans approved
by final order within the prior fiscal year which had a first tranche of funds distributed under those plans
within 12 months of such approval date.” However, this metric was excluded in the current Strategic Plan.
See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STRATEGIC PLAN FISCAL YEAR 2010-2015, 17 (2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/secstratplan1015f.pdf (last visited on May 18, 2015).
124

125

According to the SEC staff, the Office of Distributions conducts a feasibility study on the basis of 30
different factors to decide the likelihood of distribution. See Velikonja, supra note 67, at 342 (citing
interview with Nichola Timmons, Assistant Director of the SEC Office of Distributions, Dec. 24, 2013).
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distribution given the number of potential victims.”126

If distribution is unlikely to be

practical, the SEC may transfer collected monies to either the U.S. Treasury General Fund
or the Investor Protection Fund.127

For example, in SEC v. Club Atlanta Travel, et al.,

defendants were required to pay $76,698 as disgorgement.

However, since 24,000

investors from the U.S. and Canada had invested a total of $32,000,000 in this fraud case,
it was impossible to make a meaningful distribution to the investors. Thus, the collected
money was remitted to the U.S. Treasury.128

In addition, the SEC might not distribute

collected monies unless there are “investor victims.” Thus, for example, distribution may
not be appropriate in bribery cases in which the SEC has collected large monetary penalties
through Federal Corruption Practices Act (“FCPA”) enforcement actions.129
A Fair Fund can be created either in judicial proceedings or administrative
proceedings brought by the SEC.130

126

Procedures for the creation and distribution of the

Id.

The Investor Protection Fund (“IPF”) was established in 2010 pursuant to section 922 of the Dodd-Frank
Act for the purpose of paying awards to whistleblowers and funding the activities of the SEC’s Inspector
General such as the Employee Suggestion Program. The IPF is financed by depositing into the Fund any
monetary sanction collected through the SEC’s enforcement actions that is not added to a disgorgement fund
or a Fair Fund unless the balance of the Fund at the time of collection exceeds $300 million. See Dodd–
Frank Act § 922(g)(3) (15 U.S.C. 78u–6(g)(3)). The balance of the Fund amounts to $439,197,000 as of
September 30, 2013. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FISCAL YEAR 2013 AGENCY FINANCIAL REPORT, 102
(2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secafr2013.pdf#financial (last visited May 18, 2015).
127

U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Litigation Release No. 17008 (May 17, 20010); see SEC 308(C) REPORT,
supra note 58, at 14.
128

129

Velikonja, supra note 67, at 355.

130

To create a Fair Fund in judicial proceedings, the SEC moves for approval of a proposed distribution plan
in the federal court. The agency also asks the court to appoint a distribution agent or claims administrator.
Further, if a class action settlement fund already exists, the SEC may ask the court to transfer the funds
obtained by the SEC to the settlement fund for distribution. In such case, the SEC also asks of the court that
transferred monies not be used for any fees and expenses of class action counsel. See KIRKPATRICK &
LOCKHART PRESTON GATES ELLIS LLP, THE SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT MANUAL: TACTICS AND STRATEGIES
208-209 (Michael J. Missal and Richard M. Phillips eds., 2nd ed. 2007) [hereinafter “ENFORCEMENT
38

Fair Fund in administrative proceedings are governed by Sections 1100-1106 of the SEC’s
Rules of Practice. 131

In an SEC action, a Fair Fund is created by an order instituting

proceedings in which the Commission or the hearing officer (hereinafter “Commission”)
demands a respondent to pay disgorgement and civil penalties.132

2. Plan of Distribution
The plan for the administration and distribution of funds in a Fair Fund or
disgorgement fund (hereinafter “Plan of Distribution”) provides detailed guidelines on how
funds are administered and distributed to investors.133

The Commission may order any

MANUAL”].
131

See section 1100-1106 of the RULES OF PRACTICE AND RULES ON FAIR FUND AND DISGORGEMENT PLAN
(17 C.F.R. § 201.1100-1106) [hereinafter “RULES OF PRACTICE”].
132

See RULES OF PRACTICE § 1101. Paragraph (a)(5) under section 101 of the Rules of Practice defines
hearing officer as “an administrative law judge, a panel of Commissioners constituting less than a quorum of
the Commission, an individual Commissioner, or any other person duly authorized to preside at a hearing.”
Meanwhile, the Commission’s order creating a Fair Fund typically includes the following clause:
In any Pursuant to Section 308(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, as amended, a Fair Fund is
created for the disgorgement, interest and/or penalties … Regardless of whether any such Fair Fund
distribution is made, amounts ordered to be paid as civil money penalties pursuant to this Order shall
be treated as penalties paid to the government for all purposes, including all tax purposes. To
preserve the deterrent effect of the civil penalty, Respondents agree that in any Related Investor
Action, they shall not argue that they are entitled to, nor shall they benefit by, offset or reduction of
any award of compensatory damages by the amount of any part of Respondents’ payment of a civil
penalty in this action ("Penalty Offset") (emphasis added). See e.g., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n.,
In the Matter of G-Trade Services LLC, et al, Order Instituting Administrative and Cease-and-Desist
Proceedings, SEA Release No. 34-71128 (Dec. 18, 2013).
133

Paragraph (b) under section 1101 of the RULES OF PRACTICE provides that unless otherwise ordered, a
plan for the administration of a Fair Fund or a disgorgement fund include the following elements:
Procedures for the receipt of additional funds, including the specification of any account where
funds will be held, the instruments in which the funds may be invested; and, in the case of a Fair
Fund, the receipt of any funds pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 7246(b), if applicable; (2) Specification of
categories of persons potentially eligible to receive proceeds from the fund; (3) Procedures for
providing notice to such persons of the existence of the fund and their potential eligibility to receive
39

party to submit a Plan of Distribution.134

In such case, the Commission may require the

party to retain an Independent Distribution Consultant (“IDC”) to develop the proposed
Plan of Distribution.135

In simple cases, the Division of Enforcement itself would propose

a plan within sixty days after the respondent has paid monetary sanctions ordered by the
Commission, and there are no appeals of the Commission’s order.136

Notice of a proposed

Plan of Distribution is published in the SEC Docket, on the SEC website, and in other
publications as the Commission may require.137

All persons who want to comment on

the proposed plan are allowed to submit their comments, in writing, within thirty days from
the date of notice.138

The Commission must give an order of approval or disapproval of

proceeds of the fund; (4) Procedures for making and approving claims, procedures for handling
disputed claims, and a cut-off date for the making of claims; (5) A proposed date for the termination
of the fund, including provision for the disposition of any funds not otherwise distributed; (6)
Procedures for the administration of the fund, including selection, compensation, and, as necessary,
indemnification of a fund administrator to oversee the fund, process claims, prepare accountings,
file tax returns, and, subject to the approval of the Commission, make distributions from the fund to
investors who were harmed by the violation; and (7) Such other provisions as the Commission or
the hearing officer may require. (Emphasis added).
134

See RULES OF PRACTICE § 1101(a) (17 C.F.R. 201.1101(a)).

135

ENFORCEMENT MANUAL, supra note 130, at 210.

136

See RULES OF PRACTICE § 1101(a). See also ENFORCEMENT MANUAL, supra note 130, at 209 (stating
that developing the distribution plan by the SEC staff is typically made in case where distribution plan is
fairly clear-cut (e.g., a pro-rata distribution to a limited number of investors)); Velikonja, supra note 67, at
343 (mentioning the interview with the SEC staff explaining “the SEC currently does not have the resources
to administer distribution plans in-house, except for the simplest plans where a notice and claims process is
unnecessary”).
See RULES OF PRACTICE § 1103 (17 C.F.R. 201.1103)). The SEC lists on its websites the Commission’s
orders and notices pertaining to disgorgement and Fair Fund cases in administrative proceedings, available
at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/fairfundlist.htm (last visited on May 18, 2015).
137

138

See RULES OF PRACTICE § 1103 (17 C.F.R. 201.1103).
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the proposed plan within thirty days after the end of the comment period. 139

In the

discretion of the Commission, a proposed plan that is substantially modified prior to
adoption may be republished for an additional comment period.140

3. Administration of Plans
The Commission appoints a fund administrator to ensure proper distribution of
funds in accordance with the plan.

The fund administrator’s tasks include overseeing the

fund, obtaining mailing information for the eligible investors, processing claims, preparing
accountings, filing tax returns, collaborating with the tax administrator to accomplish
income tax compliance, and making distributions from the fund to harmed investors.141
Though any person may be appointed as a fund administrator,142 an administrator who is
not an SEC employee is required to post a bond to secure distribution of the Fair Fund to
the investors.143

However, the obligation to post a bond may be waived for good cause

139

See RULES OF PRACTICE § 1104 (17 C.F.R. 201.1104).

140

Id.

See RULES OF PRACTICE §1101(b)(6); e.g., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Proposed Plan of Distribution,
Admin. Proc. File No. 3-13454 (Feb. 11, 2014).
141

142

See RULES OF PRACTICE § 1105(a). Meanwhile, the Commission delegated to the Director of Division
of Enforcement the authority to appoint fund administrators from the Commission-approved pool of firms,
and to set the amount of the administrator’s bond, effective as of August 31, 2013. The Commission
approved nine firms as future fund administrators on July 15, 2013. The Office of Distributions evaluates
each administrator annually and, if the administrator performs in compliance with the requirements for
selection, they may be part of the pool for up to five years. See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Delegation of
Authority to Director of the Division of Enforcement, Release No. 34–70049 (Aug. 1, 2013), available at
https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2013/34-70049.pdf (last visited on May 19, 2015).
143

See RULES OF PRACTICE § 1105(c) (17 C.F.R. 210.1105(c)).
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by the Commission. 144

An administrator that is not an SEC employee, on the

Commission’s approval, may be paid a reasonable fee for his or her services.

Unless

otherwise ordered, fees and expenses for administration of the plan is paid from Fair Fund
proceeds.145
expenses.

In some cases, the Commission orders a respondent to pay such fees and
According to the GAO report, respondents paid Fair Fund expenses in 30

percent of cases.146

The administrator is required to file an accounting of a Fair Fund

within the first ten days of each calendar quarter; prior to being discharged, the
administrator must also submit a final accounting for the Commission’s approval.147

4. Distribution of Funds
Funds collected from defendants are distributed to eligible investors according to
their pro rata share of losses calculated using the methodology included in the distribution
plan.

In Fair Fund cases, identifying eligible investors is a difficult and time-consuming

process due to problems such as omnibus accounting and change of addresses. 148

If

144

Id. Such instances includes cases where the Fund administrator has no custody of the Fair Fund, funds
are held by the federal agencies such as the U.S. Treasury Bureau of Public Debt or held in an escrow account.
See e.g. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, In the Matter of Canadian Imperial Holdings, Inc. and CIBC World
Markets Corp., Order Approving Plan, Appointing a Fund Administrator, and Waiving Bond, Admin. Proc.
File No. 3-11987 (Feb. 23, 2010).
145

See RULES OF PRACTICE § 1105(c) (17 C.F.R. 210.1105(e)).

See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION: ADDITIONAL
ACTIONS NEEDED TO ENSURE PLANNED IMPROVEMENTS ADDRESS LIMITATIONS IN ENFORCEMENT DIVISION
OPERATIONS 1, 29 (2007) [hereinafter “GAO STUDY 1”] available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07830 (last visited on May 18, 2015).
146

147

See RULES OF PRACTICE § 1105(f) (17 C.F.R. 210.1105(f)).

148

See Deborah Solomon, Plan to Give Defrauded Investors Money from Fines Faces Hurdles--New Victim
Funds Struggle To Locate Shareholders And Decipher Records, WALL ST. J. (July 7, 2005 12:01 a.m. ET),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB112069897817279136 (last visited on May 18, 2015); see also Niels Holch,
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investors could not be found or did not cash their restitution checks within the stale date,
the residual amounts remaining in the Fair Fund are transferred to the U.S. Treasury.

In

some cases, the amounts not distributed to investors take up a significant portion of the
Fair Fund.

For example, Gabelli Funds, LLC was required to pay a total of $16 million

as disgorgement and civil penalty. 149

However, after disbursement, the Fair Fund

transferred the residual balance of $6.4 million to the U.S. Treasury. 150

Today, to

minimize the funds returned to the Treasury, the SEC and Fair Fund administrators are
making more efforts to track eligible investors, but this may take more time and delay
distribution of the Fair Fund.

Thus, in order to expedite Fair Fund distribution, the SEC

began to distribute Fair Funds in tiers or trenches, as eligible claimants are identified.151
Injured investors may also recuperate their losses through class actions in addition
to Fair Fund distributions.

The business community has argued that the amount

investors obtain from a Fair Fund should offset the amount they collect in class actions.152

Coalition of Mutual Fund Investors, Opinion: Should Revamp Its Fair-Funds Process (Feb. 18, 2014),
available
at
http://www.investorscoalition.com/sites/default/files/Ignites%20-%20SEC%20Should%20Revamp%20Its
%20Fair%20Funds%20Process%202-18-2014.pdf (last visited on May 18, 2015).
SEC v. Marc J. Gabelli and Bruce Alpert, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Litigation Release No. 20539
(April 24, 2008).
149

U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, In the Matter of Gabelli Funds, LLC, Order Authorizing the Transfer of
Remaining Funds and Any Future Funds Returned to the Fair Fund to the U.S. Treasury, Terminating the Fair
Fund, and Discharging the Fund Administrator, SEA Release No. 68733 (Jan. 25, 2013).
150

151

GAO STUDY, supra note 120, at 16.

152

See COMMISSION ON THE REGULATION OF U.S. CAPITAL MARKETS IN THE 21ST CENTURY, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 88-90 (March 2007), available at http://www.centerforcapitalmarkets.com/wpcontent/uploads/2014/06/Commission-on-the-regulation-of-us-cap-markets-report-andrecommendations.pdf (last visited on May 18, 2015).
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However, when the SEC settles a case with the defendants, it allows defendants to offset
or reduce the damage amount in related investor actions only by the disgorgement amount
paid by the defendants.153

The SEC does not permit such offsetting for civil penalties in

order “to preserve the deterrence effect of the civil penalties.”154
Nevertheless, the SEC’s prohibition against offsetting civil penalties does not
overcompensate investors.

Case law has established the principle that total payments to

shareholders cannot exceed the shareholders’ damages.

In SEC v. Risman, the U.S.

Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the SEC is obliged to administer a
distribution fund that does not duplicate compensation already made from the
restitution.155

Thus, after distributing penalty amounts to the extent that investors are

made whole, any amount left in the Fair Funds is remitted to the Treasury.156

Similarly,

in cases where the SEC settles a case prior to a class action suit, courts consider the amount
of losses covered by the Fair Fund in deciding investors’ damages.

This is evidenced by

market timing and late trading cases first identified by the SEC in 2003.

For instance,

Strong Capital Management, Inc. and affiliated firms settled the SEC’s charge of market
timing by paying $140 million, but they paid only $13.5 million in a subsequent class
action suit.157

See e.g., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, In the Matter of Janus Capital Management LLC, Order Instituting
Administrative and Cease-and-Desist Proceedings, Admin. Proc. File No. 3-11590 (Aug. 8, 2004).
153

154

Id.

155

SEC v. Risman, 7 F. App'x 30, 31 (2d Cir. 2001).

156

Plaintiff Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Distribution of Settlement Funds and Appointment of
Distribution Agent, SEC v. Dean L. Buntrock, 2005 WL 2610696 (N.D.Ill., Aug. 26, 2005)).
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, In the Matter of Strong Capital Management, Inc., et al., Order Instituting
Administrative and Cease-and-Desist Proceedings, Admin. Proc. File No. 3-11498 (May 20, 2004); Strong
157
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C. Empirical Data on Fair Funds158
1. Fair Fund Creation
Between 2002, when the Fair Fund provision was enacted, and 2013, 241 Fair
Funds were created in connection with 143 cases in federal court actions and 100 cases in
administrative proceedings.

During the same period, the courts and the SEC ordered Fair

Fund payments to investors totaling $14.46 billion, with $6.188 billion in disgorgements
and $8.276 billion in civil penalties.
the SEC by $3.376 billion.

The courts, in aggregate, ordered more monies than

This can be best explained by the fact that the courts imposed

large civil fines against corporations and their associates for violations in high-profile
cases.159

However, the data did not show a significant difference between the two types

of Fair Funds for mean size of distribution plans: $55 million in the SEC-overseen fund
and $62 million in the court-overseen fund.

Mutual Fund Market Timing Settlement Website, http://mutualfundslitigation.com/strong/index.php (last
visited on May 18, 2015).
158

Though the SEC updates the list of Fair Funds on its website whenever one is created in an administrative
proceeding, the agency does not publicize aggregate data on Fair Fund such as total amount ordered, collected,
and distributed. Thus, this part mostly relies on the empirical study conducted by professor Velikonja in
2014. In this study, the author analyzed 236 Fair Funds created between July 25, 2002 and December 31,
2013. For detailed methodology adopted in this study, see Velikonja, supra note 67, at 347-50. This part
also refers to a GAO analysis of Fair Funds created between 2002 and 2010 based on data provided by the
SEC in 2010. For methodology in this study, see GAO STUDY, supra note 120, at 10-11.
159

In the ten largest Fair Fund cases, 5.35 billion dollars, which accounted for 37.4 percent of the overall
Fair Fund amount, and, in the most part, belongs to civil fines, were imposed by the federal courts except in
two cases. The ten largest cases include AIG, Worldcom, British Petroleum, Enron, Invesco Funds, Banc of
America Capital Management, Fannie Mae, State Street, Time Warner, and J.P. Morgan. See Velikonja,
supra note 67, at 351.
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By category of securities violation,160 the majority of SEC-overseen Fair Funds
were investment advisor violation cases (54 out of 99 Fair Funds with available information,
or 54.5%), followed by 33 broker-dealer violation cases.161

In contrast, court-overseen

Fair Funds were most frequently issuer-reporting violation cases, which were 67 out 143
cases (46.8%).

In addition, the two types of Fair Funds show differences in the sources

of the funds. While $3.225 billion in disgorgements, as compared to $2.319 billion in
civil fines, were imposed in the SEC-administered Fair Funds, only $2.962 billion in
disgorgements were imposed in the court-administered Fair Funds, which was far less than
the $5.957 billion in civil fines. This is because corporations rarely obtained identifiable
ill-gotten profits from violations in issuer-reporting and disclosure cases, which were
addressed predominantly in judicial proceedings,162 unlike in the SEC Fair Fund cases
where investment advisory firms and broker-dealers received ill-gotten fees from their
customers.163

160

Professor Velikonja categorized the type of violation involved with Fair Fund cases in accordance with
the classification used in the SELECT SEC AND MARKET DATA report published annually by the SEC: Brokerdealer, insider trading, investment advisor/company, issuer reporting and disclosure, market manipulation,
securities offering, municipal. Velikonja, supra note 67, at 354.
161

The phenomenon that most of the SEC cases were concentrated in two categories is likely caused by the
limitation of its enforcement authority that the SEC seeks civil monetary penalties only against regulated
persons and entities. See Velikonja, supra note 67, at 352.
162

See Black, supra note 56, at 321-22 (stating that the SEC did not seek disgorgement against defendant
corporations in cases where they did not sell their securities through their fraudulent misstatements even
though they may have benefited in many ways from their increased market capitalization). However, in
SEC v. American International Group, Inc., the SEC sought $700 million in disgorgement on the ground that
the defendant inflated “its financial bottom line” from two transactions, one that made $500 million of phony
loss reserves, and another transaction, which hid $200 million underwriting losses. This “experiment” was
not continued in following cases. Id. at 334.
163

See Velikonja, supra note 67, at 353.
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Table 2. SUMMARY OF DATA ON FAIR FUND DISTRIBUTIONS IN SEC-AND COURTOVERSEEN FUNDS (2002-2013)164
SEC-Overseen
Funds

Court-Overseen
Funds

Overall

Number of Plans

100

143

243

Total Amount (in $M)

5,544.7

8,920.0

14,464.7

Disgorgements (in $M)

3,225.2

2,962.8

6,188.0

Civil Fines (in $M)

2,319.5

5,957.2

8,276.7

Mean Plan (in $M)

55.4

62.4

59.5

Median Plan (in $M)

19.6

10.6

16.5

Maximum (in $M)*

375.34

816.50

816.50

Minimum (in $)*

109,330

24,959

24,959

Most Common Category

Investment
Advisor
(54 of 99)

Issuer
Reporting
(67 of 143)

Issuer
Reporting
(71 of 242)

* All figures, except for those followed by an asterisk, are reported in 2013 dollars. Figures marked
with an asterisk are reported in nominal dollars.

2. Trend in Fair Fund Creation Over Time
As shown in the following graph, both the number of Fair Funds created and the
amount ordered for distribution decreased after 2007.

On average, while twenty-five Fair

Funds were established yearly distributing $1.9 billion until 2007, this number decreased
to twenty and $0.6 billion, respectively, after 2007.

Since the SEC has discretion to

determine whether to create a Fair Fund, this decline may arouse suspicion that the agency

164

Velikonja, supra note 67, at 352.
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has drawn back from its previous stance of making zealous efforts in creating Fair Funds.165
In its Fair Fund study in 2010, the GAO explained that the reason for the recent decline
was because the SEC decided that certain types of cases are not suitable for Fair Fund.166
Despite the contrasting figures before and after 2007, it is too early to reach the
conclusion that the SEC has abandoned its previous position on Fair Funds.

Low records

in recent years may have resulted from other factors. For example, the imposition of less
civil penalties may allow the SEC to establish sizable Fair Funds sufficient to compensate
harmed investors.

After announcing the statement concerning financial penalties in

January 2006, however, the SEC staff had more difficulty obtaining large penalties from
corporations than before. 167

As shown in table 3, the amount of civil penalties

significantly decreased for several years after 2006.

The high figures reported before

2007 may have been “over-shooting” due to the SEC’s experiment with corporate penalties
in response to a series of financial fraud scandals after SOX.

For the SEC’s previous stance on Fair Funds, see e.g., Christopher Cox, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, Message from the Chairman in 2006 SEC Performance and Accountability Report (Nov. 15, 2006),
available at http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secpar2006.pdf#chairman (last visited on May 18, 2015)
(emphasizing that “whenever practical, the Commission seeks to return funds to harmed investors through
the Fair Fund provision of SOX”).
165

166

GAO STUDY, supra note 120, at 15 (however, the GAO did not specify the types of cases mentioned in
the report).
167

After announcing the penalty guidelines, the Commission initiated a pilot program, which required the
SEC staff to consult with the Commission before entering into settlement negotiations in the corporate
penalty cases. This program was terminated in early 2009. Daniel M. Gallagher, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n, Speech by SEC Commissioner: Remarks at Columbia Law School Conference (Hot Topics:
Leading Current Issues in Securities Regulation and Enforcement) (Nov. 15, 2013), available at
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370540386071#.VIJL3jHF8nk (last visited on May 18,
2015).
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In addition, the recent decline may be explained by the fact that the SEC has
changed its main target among the different types of enforcement actions since 2007,
reflecting new market situations that the agency faces.168

As shown in table 3, between

2004 and 2007, the SEC’s enforcement actions were mainly focused on issuer reporting,
broker-dealer, and investment advisor/company cases, responding to major issues such as
accounting fraud scandals, mutual fund market timing, and late trading.169 Since the SEC
charged Bernard Madoff for his Ponzi scheme in 2008, the agency has put more effort into
rooting out these scams.170

Accordingly, between 2008 and 2011, enforcement actions

related to securities offerings significantly increased and targeted more individuals.
However, this brought about the creation of a relatively smaller amount of Fair Funds.171

For a detailed explanation about how changes in the SEC’s enforcement actions was related to Fair Fund,
see Velikonja, supra note 67, at 356-58.
168

Among the SEC’s diverse enforcement actions, the three types of enforcement actions mentioned above
crucially contributed to the creation of Fair Funds: The SEC established 187 Fair Funds of the total cases
(78.2%) imposed $12.469 billion of the total amount (87.2%) through such enforcement actions. See
Velikonja, supra note 67, at 354.
169

For example, the SEC states on its website that “[c]ulling Ponzi schemes and holding accountable the
individuals responsible for these scams is a vital component of the SEC’s enforcement program.” See Sec.
& Exch. Comm’n, SEC Enforcement Action against Ponzi Schemes, available at
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/enf-actions-ponzi.shtml (last visited on May 18, 2015).
170

See Velikonja, supra note 67, at 358 (explaining that in Ponzi scheme cases, “the perpetrators dissipate
the assets before the scheme is unmasked and “funds recovered in Ponzi schemes are typically distributed
through receivership, not fair funds”).
171
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Figure 2. FAIR FUNDS CREATED AND AMOUNT ORDERED FOR DISTRIBUTION
BY YEAR (2003-2012)172
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* Fair Funds are tallied by calendar year, not by the SEC’s fiscal year (October 1 - September 30).

Table 3. SEC ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS BY YEAR (FY 2004-2014)173
FY04

FY05

FY06

FY07

FY08

FY09

FY10

FY11

FY12

FY13

FY14

Total Amt. (1+2)

3.1

3.1

3.3

1.6

1.1

2.5

2.8

2.8

3.1

3.5

4.2

1.disgorgement ($B)

1.9

1.6

2.3

1.1

0.8

2.1

1.8

1.9

2.1

2.3

2.8

2.penalty ($B)

1.2

1.5

1

0.5

0.3

0.4

1

0.9

1

1.2

1.4

Total Cases

639

630

574

656

671

664

681

735

734

686

755

Issuer Reporting

179

185

138

219

157

143

126

109

94

68

106

Broker-Dealer
Investment Advisor/
Investment Company
Securities Offering

141

94

75

89

60

109

70

113

134

121

166

90

97

95

79

88

81

112

146

147

140

130

98

60

61

68

121

141

144

123

89

103

81

Delinquent Filings

21

60

91

53

111

92

106

121

127

132

107

Insider Trading

42

50

46

47

61

37

53

57

58

44

52

Market Manipulation

39

46

27

36

52

39

34

35

46

50

63

Others

29

38

41

65

21

22

36

31

39

28

50

* All dollar amounts are presented in nominal value of reported year.

172

Velikonja, supra note 67, at 357.

Data presented in the table are collected from the SEC’s report on Select SEC and Market Data, which is
published annually. In the process of preparing the table, FCPA cases are incorporated in the “Issuer
Reporting” and all remaining categories other than shown (e.g., Transfer Agent, Municipal, Contempt, SRO
or Exchange, Miscellaneous) are into “others.” See SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, SELECT SEC AND MARKET
DATA (2004-2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/secreports.shtml (last visited on May 18, 2015).
173

50

3. Completion of Distribution
According to the GAO Study conducted in 2010, most Fair Funds took longer than
two years to complete distribution of the funds.174

Another study also shows that the

average time from initial order to termination was over five years in 93 Fair Funds created
from corporate violators.175

Slow distribution is caused by many factors such as difficulty

in obtaining investor information from financial intermediaries, objections and appeals
from investors, and insufficient information necessary to calculate each investor’s share of
funds. 176

Thus, the SEC’s recent Fair Fund efforts have been mostly focused on

expediting the distribution process.177
Table 4. FAIR FUND DISTRIBUTION BY DURATION178

GAO STUDY, supra note 120, at 21 (stating that “[o]f the 128 Fair Fund cases that have not completed
distribution, 114 have been ongoing for longer than 2 years”).
174

Sonia A. Steinway, Comment, SEC “Monetary Penalties Speak Very Loudly,” But What Do They Say? A
Critical Analysis of the SEC’s New Enforcement Approach, 124 YALE L.J. 209, 214 (2014) (this study also
shows that the time between the initial order and the proposed distribution plan was 816 days).
175

176

Id. at 22; see also Deborah Solomon, For Wronged Investors, It's Payback Time--The SEC Begins Doling
Out Funds from Settlement Pools, but the Wait Can Be Long, WALL ST. J., July 7, 2005, at D1 (reporting
that slow distribution is partly due to the complexity of the settlement process).
177

See supra note 122-24 and accompanying text.

178

GAO STUDY, supra note 120, at 21.
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D. Major Fair Fund Issues
Though the SEC has made efforts to recompense investors for their losses by
distributing penalties whenever possible, the Fair Fund has been criticized by scholars in
several respects.

This section reviews the major issues that have been raised in relation

to Fair Fund distributions.

Further, this section illustrates in what circumstances the

creation of a Fair Fund is most useful, minimizing concerns with issues that will be
discussed.

1. Circularity of the Fair Fund Distribution
Just as in securities class actions,179 the circularity issue, also known as the wealth
transfer problem, is commonly criticized with regard to Fair Fund distribution.180

This

critique is typically raised when the SEC imposes penalties on a corporation to compensate
investors who purchased stocks at an inflated price in the secondary market while the
corporation was making fraudulent misstatements or omissions of material information.181
Because the penalty amount is ultimately borne by current shareholders, Fair Fund
distributions transfer monies from current shareholders who are not culpable, to investors

179

For a discussion on the circularity problem in securities class actions, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming
the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534,
1556-66 (2006) (analyzing the circularity problem in three different settings: simple wealth transfer, wealth
transfer under the assumption of diversification, and conflict between “Buy and Hold” investors versus “In
and Out” traders).
180

See e.g., Black, supra note 56, at 331; William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political Economy
of Fraud on the Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 139 (2011).
181

Coffee, supra note 177, at 1556-57. The circularity problem is usually addressed in the secondary market
case where a corporation and its shareholders do not receive profits directly from misrepresentation, unlike
in the primary market case where they benefit from over-priced issuance of the stock. Id.
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who purchased stocks during the time period in which misleading information allegedly
affected the market. 182

Thus, innocent current shareholders may be harmed by this

distribution.
The degree of harm they suffer may be somewhat different depending on the
situation each investor confronts.

To illustrate, if we assume that an investor purchases a

company’s stock before the misrepresentation and holds it at present, he bears the penalty
without any compensation and, therefore, his harm would be the largest as a result of a Fair
Fund distribution.183

In other cases, if an investor buys the stock at an inflated price by

the company’s misrepresentation and holds it at present, he pays the penalty and receives
compensation, minus administrative costs.184
However, not all Fair Fund distributions exhibit the circularity issue.

According

to the empirical study on Fair Funds by Professor Velikonja, approximately one-third of
distributions displayed the circularity problem. 185

Among diverse SEC enforcement

actions, the circularity problem is most prevalent in issuer-reporting and disclosure cases
where a public company pays the penalty.186

However, even in this category, the problem

This kind of wealth transfer can be described as “shifting money one pocket to another.” Coffee, supra
note 177, at 1558. Other commentator also compares this to “robbing Peter to pay Paul” or “robbing Peter
to pay Peter.” Black, supra note 56, at 331.
182

See Verity Winship, Fair Funds and the SEC’s Compensation for Injured Investors, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1103,
1128 (2008).
183

184

Id.

185

Velikonja, supra note 67, at 375 (explaining that 71 Fair Funds out of the total, which distributed $6.34
billion to harmed investors, were established in issuer reporting cases and corporations paid $5.1 billion, that
is approximately 35.2% of the total amount of Fair Fund distributions).
186

Id.; Winship, supra note 183, at 1129.
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does not always exist.

According to the same study, in 29 of 71 issuer-reporting cases,

the issuers did not pay monetary sanctions into Fair Funds.187
In addition, in cases where a corporation wrongfully benefits from the fraudulent
issuance of over-priced stock to investors, imposition of monetary sanctions against the
company, and indirectly its shareholders, is not “inefficiently circular.”188

Further, the

circularity concern may be significantly reduced in Fair Fund cases where the SEC seeks
penalties from individuals such as officers or directors, and third parties such as investment
banks or auditors.189

In fact, the SEC sought disgorgements and civil penalties from third-

party defendants in 61 of 71 issuer-reporting and disclosure cases, and they paid $1.24
billion in settlements.190

2. Conflict with the Bankruptcy Code
The issue of possible conflicts between Fair Fund distributions and the Bankruptcy
Code was first raised when the SEC obtained a $750 million civil penalty as a settlement
to distribute to defrauded shareholders from Worldcom who had filed for bankruptcy right
after the agency initiated the enforcement action for massive accounting fraud. 191

187

Velikonja, supra note 67, at 376.

188

Id. at 377 (comparing such case to damages for price fixing or polluting drinking water and explaining
that imposing the penalty on the corporation and its shareholders in such case can induce the company to
monitor employee misconduct and internalize a negative externality); see also, Coffee, supra note 177, at
1562.
189

See infra discussion in Part IV(E)(3).

190

Velikonja, supra note 67, at 376.

See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Litigation Release No. 17588, Civil Action 02 CV 4963 (S.D.N.Y.) (June
27, 2002); SEC v. Wordcom Inc., 273 F.Supp. 2d 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). For brief history of Worldcom civil
and bankruptcy case, see also Zack Christensen, The Fair Funds for Investors Provision of Sarbanes-Oxley:
191
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According to section 510(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, shareholders’ claims for damages
arising from the purchase or sale of a security are subordinate to all other creditors of the
bankrupt company.192

However, this provision does not directly prohibit the SEC from

distributing collected monies to shareholders for damages after the agency has collected
penalties from the bankruptcy estate as an unsecured creditor.193

Thus, shareholders can

recover damages more than they would in the bankruptcy proceeding without the Fair Fund
distribution, and shares for other unsecured creditors are proportionately reduced by that
amount.194

The district court and bankruptcy court of the Worldcom case recognized a

potential problem, but approved the settlement with the SEC.195
The priority conflict between the Fair Fund provision and the Bankruptcy Code’s
absolute priority rule brought criticism that the Fair Fund provision “alter[ed] the wellestablished distributional priorities of bankruptcy law” and resulted in unfairness to

Is It Unfair to the Creditors of a Bankrupt Debtor?, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 339, 355-58 (2005); Marvin E.
Sprouse III, A Collision of Fairness: Sarbanes-Oxley and 510(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, 24 AM. BANKR.
INST. J. 8, 9 (2005).
192

Section 510(b) provides:
For the purpose of distribution under this title, a claim arising from rescission of a purchase or sale
of a security of the debtor or of an affiliate of the debtor, for damages arising from the purchase or
sale of such a security, or for reimbursement or contribution allowed under section 502 on account
of such a claim, shall be subordinated to all claims or interests that are senior to or equal the claim
or interest represented by such security, except that if such security is common stock, such claim
has the same priority as common stock.

193

Velikonja, supra note 67, at 366.

194

Id. at 366-67.

See SEC v. Worldcom Inc., supra note 57, at 434 (stating that “a penalty that was premised primarily ...
might arguably run afoul of the provisions of the Code that subordinate shareholder claims below all others”);
In re Worldcom Inc., Ch. 11 Case No. 02-13533, Docket #8125 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2003) (stating that
“[i]n considering approval of a settlement, the court is not required to resolve the underlying legal issues
related to the settlement”).
195
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innocent general creditors.196

Specifically, some commentators pointed out that treating

shareholders equal to unsecured creditors in bankruptcy does not make sense when looking
into the legislative history of section 510(b), which was enacted to correct such unfair
treatment. 197

However, after Worldcom, the SEC rarely imposed monetary penalties

against bankrupt companies.198

The SEC sought penalties in only two cases among 16

issuer-reporting and disclosure cases199 where conflict was most likely to occur: Worldcom
and Nortel Networks.200

3. Duplication of Securities Class Action Suits
Critics of Fair Funds have also claimed that they just “mimic” or “duplicate”
private securities class actions and waste resources, 201 and show only “low investor

Christensen, supra note 191, at 344 (arguing that “Congress should amend section 308(a) of SarbanesOxley to clarify that it does not circumvent section 510(b)); see also e.g., Black, supra note 56, at 332-33
(criticizing that the SEC and courts failed “to appreciate sufficiently the impact on other innocent
stakeholders”); Sprouse, supra note 191, at 8 (stating that “the courts have not resolved the dissonances
between Sarbanes-Oxley and the Code”).
196

See Christensen, supra note 191, at 358-60 (explaining that “Congress consciously adopted the underlying
premise of the Slain and Kripke argument” that “claims of rescinding shareholders should generally be
subordinated to the claims of general unsecured creditors” in the light of the risk allocation of illegal securities
issuance between security holders and the issuer’s creditors); Sprouse, supra note 191, at 8 (stating that “[t]he
era of defrauded shareholder/unsecured creditor distributive equality ended with the enactment of the Code
and its §510(b)).
197

See Velikonja, supra note 67, at 368 (stating that “[t]he Worldcom Fair Fund cast a dark shadow over the
SEC’s distribution efforts, but Worldcom is the exception, not the rule”).
198

Of 236 Fair Fund cases, 31 primary defendant companies “filed for bankruptcy within two years of the
SEC enforcement actions” and 16 of those were issuer-reporting and disclosure cases. Id. at 367.
199

200

However, in the Nortel Networks case, the company paid a $35 million civil penalty in November 2007
and filed for bankruptcy in January 2009. Thus, the penalty did not directly affect creditors’ recovery in its
bankruptcy proceeding. Id.
201

Id. at 15-16; See also Adam S. Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, 86 NYU L. REV. 500, 519 (2011)
(exploring “problems when regulatory agencies mimic class action settlement by forcing wrongdoers to
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recovery.”202

Some argue that when a Fair Fund case accompanies a parallel class action

for “the same conduct against the same actors,” it may “duplicate administrative costs”
which are paid to the distribution agent or fund administrator.203

In a situation where both

public and private actions are available,204 if public compensation through the Fair Fund
is expensive or “simply duplicating the compensation mechanisms and associated costs,”
the Fair Fund compensation would not make sense.205

Besides administrative costs, some

commentators argue that even though the Fair Fund distribution does not directly incur
“attorney’s fees” like in private litigation,206 costs that occur when the SEC performs the

compensate their victims”); Winship, supra note 183, at 1136 (stating that “the parallel distributions may
duplicate administrative costs when both private and public actions are brought for the same conduct against
the same actors”); Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio & Adam S. Zimmerman, The Agency Class Action, 112 COLUM.
L. REV. 1992 (2012) (“agencies routinely waste resources on repetitive cases”); Bratton & Wachter, supra
note 180, at 139 (stating that “[A] Fair Funds distribution to a subset of shareholders is every bit as much an
exercise in pocket shifting as is payment of a FOTM settlement.”).
202

See Winship, supra note 183, at 1124-27.

203

See e.g., Id. at 1136.

According to the Velikonja’s study, private class actions were filed in 154 of 238 Fair Fund cases, except
8 cases which “could not be determined whether a parallel class action was filed” between 2003 and 2012.
Velikonja, supra note 67, at 369-70.
204

205

Winship, supra note 183, at 1136.

206

See Paul S. Atkins, Comm'r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks Before the U.S. Chamber Institute for
Legal Reform (Feb. 16, 2006) (emphasizing the advantage of the Fair Fund over the private class action,
considering that investors’ recoveries under the Fair Fund provision are not reduced by legal fees to private
lawyers unlike in class actions), available at https//www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch021606psa.htm (last
visited on May 18, 2015). However, professor Black pointed out that “this advantage … is diminished if, as
is likely, securities plaintiffs’ attorneys have greater incentives than government attorneys to negotiate a larger
amount because their compensation depends on it.” Black, supra note 56, at 339. Professor Coffee also
suggested empirical data, explaining that “plaintiff’s attorneys appear to extract more funds from corporate
pocketbooks than do all federal and state regulators.” See Coffee, supra note 177, at 1542-43 (citing Jackson,
Howell E., Variation in the Intensity of Financial Regulation: Preliminary Evidence and Potential
Implications 15-29 (HARVARD LAW SCH. JOHN M. OLIN CTR. FOR LAW, ECON. & BUS., Discussion Paper No.
521, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=839250 (on file with the Columbia Law Review)).
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compensatory role, and that are finally paid by taxpayers, should also be considered in
assessing whether public or private actions are better for investor compensation.207
Securities class action suits were originally recognized as a means to recompense
injured investors for their losses.208
less meaningful. 209

Nowadays, however, its compensatory function is

Scholars have identified flaws with the compensatory role of

securities class actions on several grounds.

First, recovering from settlement payments

by the corporation only results in “transferring money from one pocket to the other” for
institutional investors and other shareholders who bought their shares during the class
period and still own them when a suit is brought.210

Second, a fully diversified investor

will not experience any damage from securities fraud because his expected gains and losses
net out.211

207

The investors who are the most likely to be compensated in class actions are

Winship, supra note 183, at 1135.

208

Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring the Relationship Between
Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 10B-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 1308-10 (2008).
209

Id. at 1312-13 (explaining that traditional compensatory rational grew less persuasive and a deterrencebased justification becomes more important); see also Coffee, supra note 177, at 1545 (stating “[f]rom a
compensatory perspective, the conclusion seems inescapable that the securities class action performs
poorly.”).
210

Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages In Securities Class Action, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1487, 1503-04
(1996) (pointing out the problem that “the amounts paid by defendants are not delivered fairly and efficiently
to class members” in class action); see also Rose, supra note 208, at 1313. Even though the same result would
happen when the SEC imposes penalties on a corporation and distributes them to investors, the SEC may
lessen such concern by considering a duplicative harm for shareholders in its enforcement and shifting its
targets to individual offenders. See discussion infra in Part IV(E)(3). However, such behavior is less likely to
occur in class actions.
211

Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 611,
641 (1985); Donald C. Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open-Market Securities Fraud, 38 ARIZ. L. REV.
639, 646 (1996) (“each loser-the buyer or seller disadvantaged by the fraud- is balanced by another winner:
the person on the other side of the trade”); Alexander, supra note 210, at 1502 (“[a]n investor who is
completely diversified will be fully compensated for its trading losses that are due to securities fraud by
windfalls on other transactions”); Rose, supra note 208, at 1313.
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institutional investors who are well diversified, and compensating such investors through
class action litigation is unnecessary and only incurs costly attorney’s fees and expenses.212
Third, securities class actions do not provide defrauded investors with sufficient
compensation. 213

An empirical study shows that investors continually recover only a

small portion of their losses from securities class action suits- in rough measure,
approximately 2% of their losses in recent years.214

Further, investor’s recovery will be

even smaller after subtracting the costs paid from the settlement such as plaintiffs’
attorney’s fees and expenses. 215

One commentator argues that the full costs borne by

investors in class actions may even exceed the aggregate recovery.216
In addition to such shortcomings, class actions become less available for defrauded
investors by substantive and procedural restrictions created by the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA).

212

217

Notably, the PSLRA significantly

Alexander, supra note 210, at 1502.

Coffee, supra note 177, at 1545-47 (“[s]ettlements recover only a very small share of investor losses”);
Rose, supra note 208, at 1313.
213

214

Renzo Comolli & Svetlana Starykh, NERA ECON. CONSULTING, Recent Trends in Securities Class Action
Litigation: 2013 Full-Year Review: Large settlements get larger; small settlements get smaller (2014)
available at http://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/2014/PUB_Year_End_Trends_1.2014.pdf
(last visited May 18, 2015) (according to the study, the median ratio of settlement to investor losses recorded
2.1% in 2013 and the ratio never hit 3% since 2006. Based on analysis of data from 2006 to 2013, the median
settlement for cases with investor losses of less than $20 million has been 17.1% of the investor losses, and
the median settlement for cases with investor losses over $1 billion has been 0.7% of the investor losses).
For the period of 2011-2013, median plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees and expenses range between 10.7% and
34.1% of settlement value by size of settlement. Id. at 34-35
215

Coffee, supra note 177, at 1546 (illustrating that full costs accompanied by class action include “plaintiffs’
attorneys’ fees and expenses, defense counsels’ fees and expenses, Directors’ and Officers’ (D&O) insurance
premiums, and the possible costs of disruption, stigma, and adverse publicity” and arguing that such costs
eventually “fall on the corporation’s shareholders”).
216

217

Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
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heightened pleading requirements in Rule 10b-5 actions to limit frivolous securities
lawsuits.

Under the PSLRA, the complaint is required to allege with specificity: the

statement or omission alleged to have been misleading, and the reason;218 if an allegation
is made on information and belief, all facts on which that belief is formed;219 and facts
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.220
The plaintiff must also plead and prove loss causation. 221

Moreover, the PSLRA

precludes all discovery during the pendency of a motion to dismiss.222
The PSLRA was designed to cut off meritless claims, but it also increased the
possibility of dismissing meritorious claims. 223

Some class actions with parallel SEC

enforcement actions creating a Fair Fund were dismissed for failing to meet such pleading
requirements.

For example, the class action against Biogen Idec, Inc. was dismissed for

failure to specify ‘scienter’ sufficiently.224

Another class action against Lehman Brothers

218

Exchange Act § 21D(b)(1) (codified as 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)).

219

Id.

220

Exchange Act § 21D(b)(2) (codified as 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)); see Tellab, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights,
Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 318-24 (2007) (holding that “[a] complaint survives only if a reasonable person would
deem the inference of scienter cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference one could draw
from the facts alleged.”).
221

Exchange Act § 21D(b)(4) (codified as 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4)); see Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v.
Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-43 (2005) (holding that “an inflated purchase price will not itself constitute or
proximately cause the relevant economic loss” needed to allege and prove loss causation).
222

Exchange Act § 21D(b)(3)(B) (codified as 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B)).

223

Rose, supra note 208, at 1319-20; Langevoort, supra note 211, at 640-41; Velikonja, supra note 67, at
371 (explaining that “[PSLRA] also bar many meritorious suits, in particular those that do not fit neatly in
the material-misrepresentation-followed-by-subsequent-correction-and-price-decline mold.”)
In re Biogen Idec, Inc. Civil Action No. 05-10400-WGY (D. Mass. Oct. 25, 2007) (holding that “[e]ven
if inferences of scienter may be drawn from allegations of motive and opportunity, it is not enough to satisfy
the PSLRA standard in the absence of other probative factual allegations.”); see also SEC v. Thomas J.
Bucknum, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Litigation Release No. 19528 (Jan. 12, 2006) (Bucknum, the former
224

60

Holdings, Inc. was also dismissed due to failure to plead ‘loss causation.’225

A study also

shows that investors were not compensated in 53.2% of parallel private litigations with Fair
Fund distributions.226

Thus, in such cases, investors have no option but to rely on Fair

Fund distributions to recover their losses.

In summary, in both theory and reality,

securities class action suits have limitations as a compensation scheme and the Fair Fund
distribution is not wasteful and duplicative as far as class actions are concerned.
However, to eradicate any risk of the duplication problem, the U.S. may consider
restricting securities class actions in cases where the SEC initiates the enforcement action
for securities law violations against the defendants.

As seen above, even successful class

actions merely return a small settlement after subtracting attorney’s fees and expenses to
injured investors.

Further, parallel litigation of the SEC and class action suits may

aggravate problems such as duplication of costs and waste of resources.

When the SEC

decided to create a $602 million Fair Fund by a majority vote for victims of S.A.C. Capital
Advisors’ insider trading, two dissenting Commissioners expressed the view that creating
a Fair Fund in parallel proceedings benefits only class action attorneys and the fund
administrators. 227

Thus, it is more efficient for investors to wait until after an SEC

general counsel of Biogen, settled the SEC’s charges with insider trading in the stock of Biogen by agreeing
to pay $3million); Litigation Release No. 20262 (Aug. 31, 2007) (announcing that SEC initiated $3 million
Fair Fund distribution to purchasers of Biogen common stock).
225

Swack v. Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., Civil Action No. 03-10907-NMG (D. Mass. Aug. 17, 2005)
(holding that “[b]ecause the plaintiffs have not adequately pled loss causation, defendant's motion to dismiss
will be allowed.”); see also SEC v. Lehman Brothers Inc., Litigation Release No. 18116 (April 28, 2003).
226

Velikonja, supra note 67, at 369.

227

Daniel M. Gallapher & Michael S. Piwowar, Dissenting From an SEC Windfall for Lawyers, WALL ST. J.
(op-ed, Nov. 10, 2014, 7:32 p.m. ET), http://www.wsj.com/articles/daniel-m-gallagher-and-michael-spiwowar-dissenting-from-an-sec-windfall-for-lawyers-1415665948 (last visited on May 18, 2015).
61

enforcement action and Fair Fund distribution.

In addition, limiting class actions in such

a manner would also be an effective means to prevent frivolous class actions because the
SEC’s failure to prove the case in its civil action may signal to investors that their claims
would also be hopeless considering the higher pleading requirements under the PSLRA.
Similarly, for the purpose of minimizing social costs created by duplication and frivolous
suits, Congress may consider authorizing the SEC to review private securities class actions
before they are filed in court and decide whether the claim should be pursued.228
Meanwhile, the SEC has made its own effort to minimize duplicative costs in Fair
Fund distributions—the agency employs the same distribution agent in cases where Fair
Funds are directed to a class action account.229

For example, in the Bristol-Myers Squibb

Co. case,230 the SEC transferred a $150 million settlement to the Garden City Group LLC,
a claims administrator who was already handling a $300 million class action settlement.231
Thus, the Fair Fund was distributed on the same schedule as the class action settlement.232

Rose, supra note 208, at 1354-58 (proposing the “oversight approach” authorizing the SEC to prescreen
securities class actions).
228

229

Velikonja, supra note 67, at 386-87 (according to her study, among 222 Fair Fund cases except 18 cases
where the SEC ordered defendants to directly compensate victims, “the SEC developed the Fair Fund
distribution plan with reference to the class action” in 47 cases).
U.S. Sec & Exch. Comm’n, Litigation Release No. 18820 (Aug. 2, 2004), SEC v. Bristol-Myers Squibb
Company, Civil Action No. 04-3680 (D.N.J.) (Filed Aug. 4, 2004).
230

U.S. Sec & Exch. Comm’n, Litigation Release No. 18867 (Sep. 2, 2004), SEC v. Bristol-Myers Squibb
Company, Civil Action No. 04-3680 (D.N.J.) (Filed Aug. 4, 2004).
231

232

Id.
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This made it possible for Bristol’s investors to recover their losses more quickly and with
fewer costs.233
Moreover, the SEC often directs defendants to pay costs related to the distribution
in cases where funds are distributed through its “customized distribution plan.”234

One

study shows that duplication was not incurred in 171 of 217 Fair Fund cases. 235

The

remaining cases can be considered duplicative. However, in all but 6 cases, class actions
were settled after the agency’s actions, and the SEC had to distribute funds under its
distribution plan first because holding Fair Funds until parallel class actions were
completed could have brought criticisms of delay.236

4. Conflict with the SEC’s Missions
Some commentators have raised questions with respect to the SEC’s missions and
various goals that the agency seeks, and have argued that the SEC’s compensation efforts
may weaken the “effectiveness of the SEC as an enforcement agency.” 237

The SEC

describes it mission as “[t]o protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets,

233

Solomon, supra note 148.

Velikonja, supra note 67, at 388 (the SEC developed “customized distribution plan” in 149 of 222 cases).
According to the GAO, 70 percent of Fair Fund “have provisions whereby fund proceeds are used to pay
administrative expenses.” In remaining 30 percent of cases, “the individual or entity sued in the relevant
enforcement action, such as a mutual fund company, pay Fair Fund expenses.” GAO STUDY 1, supra note
146, at 29 n.39.
234

235

Velikonja, supra note 67, at 388.

236

Id. at 388-89.

237

See e.g., Black, supra note 56, at 319-20; Winship, supra note 183, at 1139; Steinway, supra note 175, at
213 (stating that “[d]eterring future misconduct … was demoted to an “additional” [compensation] concern”).
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and facilitate capital formation.”238

The SEC also set forth four goals to accomplish its

missions in its 2014-2018 Strategic Plan. 239

Historically, the SEC accomplished its

missions by “enforcing securities law, sanctioning securities law violators, and deterring
future frauds,” not by compensating defrauded investors.240

The SEC did not specifically

identify returning money to injured investors “as part of its mission or goals.” 241
Compensating investors is not an internationally recognized objective of securities
regulation, either.242
However, after the enactment of the Fair Fund provision of SOX, the SEC’s limited
resources were devoted to seeking large penalties in enforcement actions against
corporations with “deep pockets” and establishing and distributing Fair Funds.243

One

study shows that mean market capitalization of firms that the SEC brought enforcement

See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, About the SEC, What
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited on May 18, 2015).
238

We

Do,

available

at

239

Four goals include establishing and maintaining an effective regulatory environment, fostering and
enforcing compliance with the federal securities laws, facilitating access to the information investors need to
make informed investment decisions, enhancing the Commission’s performance through effective alignment
and management of human, information and financial capital. See 2014-2018 STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note
124, at 5-6.
See Black, supra note 56, at 319-20, 341; see also U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks by Commissioner
Richard B. Smith of the Securities and Exchange Commission at Program of Continuing Education of the
BAR of the State of California, at Los Angeles (Jan. 12, 1968) (stating that “[t]he Commission attempts to
avoid being a collection agency for injured investors”).
240

241

Black, supra note 56, at 342.

242

Black, supra note 56, at 319. International Organizations of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) identifies
three objectives of securities regulation as protecting investors, ensuring that markets are fair, efficient and
transparent, and reducing systemic risk. See IOSCO, OBJECTIVES & PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES REGULATION
(June 2010), available at https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD323.pdf (last visited on May
18, 2015).
243

Winship, supra note 183, at 1136.
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actions against after 2002 was more than 23 times bigger than before.244

This raised the

concern that the SEC may “divert resources” necessary to develop regulations and seek
other important enforcement actions.245

For example, in 2007, the SEC failed to reach,

by 12 percent, its target rate related to enforcement actions, which represents “the
percentage of first enforcement actions filed within two years of opening an investigation
or inquiry,” and attributed this failure to Fair Fund workload.246
In addition, critics have commented that the SEC’s compensatory role is
inconsistent with its mission of deterring future violations.

One commentator argues that

if the SEC pursues compensation as one of its goals, this could “cause either overdeterrence or under-deterrence of securities law violations.”247

For example, imposing

penalties on large corporation to compensate injured investors over-deters because it does
not have a deterrence effect on the wrongdoers who caused the harm. 248

Another

commentator also argues that the SEC’s mission of deterrence conflicts with its
compensatory role when the agency seeks enforcement actions against aiders and
abettors.249

The SEC needs to pursue compensation from aiders and abettors because

244

James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas & Dana Kiku, Public and Private Enforcement of the Securities Laws:
Have Things Changed Since Enron?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 893, 902 (2005) (also stating that, after 2002,
“average market capitalization of firms subject to both private and SEC actions is more than six times greater
than for firms that are the subject only to private actions,” but reverse in pre-2002).
245

See Zimmerman, supra note 201, at 541; see also Black, supra note 56, at 344.

See Winship, supra note 183, at 1136 (citing U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 2007 Performance and
Accountability Report, 27 (2007)).
246

247

See Id. at 1139.

248

Id. (also arguing that it would under-deter if the SEC would not impose the penalty just because it cannot
be used for compensation).
249

Adam Reiser, Compensating Defrauded Investors While Preserving the SEC’s Mission of Deterrence: A
65

private plaintiffs do not have a cause of action against them after the Supreme Court’s
decision in Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A. 250
Securing civil penalties from aiders and abettors also does not raise the circularity problem
unlike the penalty against a corporate defendant.

However, with respect to deterrence,

aiding and abetting cases may be less effective than cases “against large, highly visible
primary actors like Enron and Worldcom,” because such prominent cases may send
stronger deterrence messages to the industry and the public.251
However, the SEC and the courts have expressed different views from these
scholarly criticisms.

The SEC views the Fair Fund distribution as “a desirable and

important objective,” and has said it is “consistent with its mission to protect investors.”252
Instead, the SEC has focused on how to improve operational efficiency of the Fair Fund
within its limited resources. 253

A U.S. Court of Appeals, in Official Committee of

Unsecured Creditors of Worldcom, Inc. v. SEC, rejected the Committee’s argument that the
court should apply a different standard of review from the “fair and reasonable” standard
of disgorgement plans because the “Fair Fund provision substitutes compensation for
deterrence as the focus of SEC actions.”254

The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Fair

Call for Congress to Counteract the Troubling Consequences of Stoneridge, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 257, 265
(2009).
250

Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 177 (1994).

251

See Reiser, supra note 249, at 264-65; see also James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, SEC Enforcement
Heuristics: An Empirical Inquiry, 53 DUKE L. J. 737, 759 (2003).
252

SEC 308(C) REPORT, supra note 58, at 22.

253

For the SEC’s improvements on Fair Fund operation, see discussion supra in Part IV(A).

254

467 F.3d 73, 83 (2d Cir. 2006).
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Fund provision did not change the SEC’s role, but “merely increase[d] the funds that the
SEC may distribute.”255

Therefore, the SEC’s Fair Fund is a means of promoting ‘ex post’

investor protection by compensating investors, and does not deviate from the agency’s
traditional mission of deterrence.

5. Lack of Procedural Protection
Other commentators have reviewed the SEC’s Fair Fund distribution from a
procedural perspective.

One commentator argued that unlike class actions,256 the SEC

did not provide different victims with sufficient opportunity to take part “in the formation
of the distribution plan.”257

The SEC does not permit interested parties to intervene or

participate in an agency proceeding, or challenge the distribution plan under the Rules of
Practice,258 except for the opportunity for notice and comment.259

255

Thus, the interests of

Id.

256

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides interested parties with the opportunity to participate in the class
action. For example, individual notice is made to all identifiable class members. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2).
Moreover, a class may be divided into subclasses so that different interests can be adequately represented by
different counsel. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(5).
Zimmerman, supra note 201, at 530 (criticizing that “the SEC … deny parties any voice in the formation
of a distribution plan”).
257

258

Section 1106 of the RULES OF PRACTICE provides:
Other than in connection with the opportunity to submit comments … no person shall be granted
leave to intervene or to participate or otherwise to appear in any agency proceeding or otherwise to
challenge an order of disgorgement or creation of a Fair Fund ... (emphasis added).

259

Unlike class actions providing individual notice to class members, notice of proposed distribution plan is
published in the Federal Register and on the SEC’s website. Zimmerman, supra note 201, at 549 (stating that
“[i]n all but three of these thirteen published funds … no one responded to the invitation for public comment”).
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different parties (e.g., shareholders, creditors, or institutional investors) may not be fairly
represented in the distribution.260
Another commentator argues that when the SEC does not allow interested parties
to participate in the course of the settlement along with the defendants, the agency “may
miss an important opportunity to calculate damage, identify different interests, and force
wrongdoers to accurately account for the harm they cause.”
Settlement is one example that reflects this concern.262

261

Global Research Analyst

In this case, the SEC failed to

identify injured investors and their losses in some of the settlements. 263

The federal

district court scolded the SEC for “fail[ing] to offer a clear framework for formulating and
implementing a distribution plan.”264

In the end, the SEC had no choice but to transfer

$79 million to the U.S. Department of Treasury after wasting over $13 million in fund
costs.265

260

Zimmerman, supra note 201, at 531.

261

Id. at 547-48.

262

SEC v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 626 F. Supp. 2d 402. In this case, the SEC alleged that investment banks
exercised inappropriate influence over research analysts to promote investment banking business and this
resulted in conflicts of interest with research analysts. After a lengthy investigation, the agency settled
enforcement actions against 12 investment banks and 2 research analysts. Id. at 404. For the details of the
SEC’s settlement, see Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Ten of Nation's Top Investment Firms
Settle Enforcement Actions Involving Conflicts of Interest Between Research and Investment Banking (April
28, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-54.htm (last visited on May 18, 2015).
SEC v. Bear, Stearns & Co., supra note 262, at 405 (stating that “the distribution plan was not tethered to
any identified aggrieved investors”).
263

264

Id. at 404.

Id. at 410-11, 420. See also Zimmerman, supra note 201, at 567 (stating that “[i]f the SEC had involved
plaintiffs earlier in the settlement process with Bear Stearns … the agency could have avoided the
embarrassment of spending resources to restore losses that never actually existed”).
265

68

However, other commentators have defended the SEC by arguing that after the
Global Research Analyst Settlement case, the agency “has made an effort to identify
victims during the settlement process.”266

The writer argues that the fact that defrauded

investors can have their voices heard in a parallel class action suit where the Fair Fund is
directed mitigates the concern, because the Fair Fund and class action settlement are
distributed under the same distribution plan.267
To enhance procedural protections for claimants and other interested parties, the
SEC might consider adopting guidelines on Fair Fund distributions.

In the course of

developing such guidelines, the procedures used in class action suits may provide the SEC
with useful guidance. This is because both Fair Fund distributions and class actions deal
with with collective claims and procedures of aggregate litigation (e.g., class actions), and
both strive for consistency, efficiency, and legal access, compared to those methods used
by administrative agencies. 268

Specifically, the American Law Institute’s (“ALI”)

Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation (“Principles”) provides general principles for
aggregate proceedings and individual principles for aggregate adjudication and
settlements.269

For example, one of the objectives of the Principles is “enabling claimants

to voice their concerns and facilitating the rendition of further relief that protects the rights

266

Velikonja, supra note 67, at 390 (stressing, as its evidence, that the SEC ordered investment banks to
compensate the victims directly in recent cases without distributing through the Fair Fund).
267

Id. at 390-91.

Sant’Ambrogio & Zimmerman, supra note 201, at 2001 (stating that “[f]ederal court class actions and
other aggregate procedures have long sought consistency, efficiency, and legal access”).
268

269

AM. LAW INST., Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation (2012).
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of affected persons.” 270

To achieve this objective, the Principles require the court to

ensure the participation of class members and objectors in the course of a preliminary
review of the proposed settlement.271

In addition, the Principles contain many provisions

applicable to Fair Fund distribution such as settlement criteria,272 and direct and cy-pres
distribution of settlement proceeds.273

Thus, adopting such guidelines in the distribution

process may be helpful in enhancing efficiency, consistency, and fairness in Fair Fund
distributions.

E. The SEC’s Enforcement Actions in Light of the Fair Fund

Based on the discussion above, this section suggests some situations where the
SEC’s distribution of a Fair Fund can be useful, minimizing concerns such as the circularity
problem and duplication of costs.274

270

Principles § 1.04(b)(5).

271

Principles § 3.03(a).

272

Principles § 3.05(a).

273

Principles § 3.07.

In brief, the SEC’s effort to distribute the Fair Fund

274

Professor Winship’s suggested criteria for creating a Fair Fund seeks to minimize concerns with
circularity and potential duplication of costs. To prioritize different types of Fair Fund creation, she
categorized them as four situations, depending on whether penalties are imposed on issuers or non-issuers,
and whether only the SEC action is available or both the SEC and private action are available. She argued
that Fair Fund is the most appropriate for a situation where the SEC seeks “penalties against non-issuers
when only the SEC has a cause of action.” On the other hand, Fair Fund is the most problematic in a situation
where it seeks “penalties against issuers when either a private or public action is available.” In deciding the
second and third priority, she viewed the circularity problem (issuer or non-issuer categorization) as more
fundamental than cost duplication (single or parallel action categorization), which made place the second in
priority “distribution of penalties against non-issuers when either a private or public action is available.” See
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may be sufficiently justified when the agency brings enforcement actions against aiders
and abettors, market intermediaries, and individual defendants such as directors and
officers. Focusing enforcement actions against those defendants may enable the SEC to
compensate harmed investors without compromising the agency’s traditional mission of
deterrence.

1. Aiders and Abettors
Firstly, the SEC’s Fair Fund can be useful when harmed investors have no private
right of action.

In private securities actions, aiders and abettors such as underwriters,

accounting firms, investment advisers and banks, have traditionally been targets for
investors as a possible source of investor compensation because investors sought to recover
losses from such deep pockets, particularly when an issuer is insolvent.

However, in

Central Bank, the Supreme Court held that liability under 10(b) of the Exchange Act did
not extend to aiders and abettors.275

Responding to the Supreme Court’s decision, in §104

of the PSLRA, Congress created an express cause of action for aiding and abetting liability
in an SEC enforcement actions, but not in private actions.276

Further, in Stoneridge Inv.

Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.,277 the Supreme Court put a stop to attempts “to

Winship, supra note 183, at 1141-44.
275

Central Bank, 511 U.S. 163, 177 (1994).

276

Exchange Act § 20(e) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C § 78t(e)).

277

Stoneridge, 552 U.S. 148 (2008).
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upgrade an aider and abettor to a primary violator.”278

In this case, the Supreme Court

significantly restricted private causes of action against aiders and abettors under 10(b).279
The SEC is now the sole plaintiff who can seek compensation from aiders and abettors.
In Stoneridge, the Supreme Court also stressed the role of the SEC’s Fair Fund as an
alternative for private actions.280

Further, the SEC’s action against aiders and abettors

also benefits from the fact that it may relieve the circularity concern, which has been mostly
criticized in Fair Fund cases.281

2. Market Intermediaries
Secondly, the Fair Fund may also be a useful remedy in actions against market
intermediaries such as broker-dealers and investment advisers.

Every year, the SEC

brings a variety of enforcement actions against market intermediaries for their violations
of securities laws,282 and also creates Fair Funds.

Violations include interest rate fixing,

undisclosed fees and false advertising, collusive arrangements between investment funds
and broker-dealers, mutual fund market timing and late trading, and self-dealing.283

278

In

Reiser, supra note 249, at 259.

279

Stoneridge, supra note 277, at 159 (the Supreme Court reasoned that reliance by investors upon the
deceptive acts is essential in 10(b) private cause of action, but the petitioner failed to show that investors
relied respondents’ deceptive acts and indirect chain is too remote for liability.).
Id. at 166 (stating that “[e]nforcement power is not toothless. Since September 30, 2002, SEC enforcement
actions have collected over $10 billion in disgorgement and penalties, much of it for distribution to injured
investors”).
280

281

Winship, supra note 183, at 1133.

282

See Table 3 SEC ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS BY YEAR (FY 2004-13), at 59.

283

Velikonja, supra note 67, at 336-37.
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such cases, before the SEC announces its enforcement action, investors may not have even
realized that they have been defrauded or victimized.284

In fact, a study shows that such

cases were not usually prosecuted as private class actions.285

This may be explained by

the fact that the amounts are not large enough to bring a private action or it is difficult for
the plaintiff to satisfy the heightened pleading standards under the PSLRA. 286

For

example, the SEC ordered Morgan Stanley to pay $50 million,287 Franklin/Templeton $20
million,288 and Hartford Investment Financial Services $55 million289 in administrative
proceedings, but those cases were dismissed in parallel class actions.
In addition, even when such cases were brought into court, private litigation was
not as effective for compensating investors. For example, a Fair Fund study shows that
among 64 cases of SEC enforcement actions against investment advisers, 33 cases were
accompanied by private litigation and 20 of those settled for an aggregate of $471 million

284

Id. at 374.

285

Cox and Thomas, supra note 251, at 750 (reporting that class actions are limited in cases involving market
manipulation, broker-dealer, investment company, and investment advisers misconduct).
286

Velikonja, supra note 67, at 369.

U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, In the Matter of Morgan Stanley DW Inc., SA Release No. 8339 (Nov. 17,
2003) (finding that Morgan Stanley failed to adequately disclose to customers at the point of sale the higher
fees associated with large purchases of Class B shares of certain of its proprietary mutual funds and it also
failed to explain to customers that those fees could have a negative impact on customers' investment returns).
287

U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, In the Matter of Franklin Advisers, Inc. & Franklin/Templeton Distributors,
Inc., SEA Release No. 50841 (Dec. 13, 2004) (finding that Franklin, without proper disclosure, used $52
million of fund assets to compensate brokerage firms for marketing the Franklin Templeton mutual funds and
it created a conflict of interest between Franklin Advisers and the mutual funds).
288

U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, In the Matter of Hartford Investment Financial Services, LLC, HL
Investment Advisors, LLC & Hartford Securities Distribution Company, Inc., SA Release No. 8750 (Nov. 8,
2006) (finding that Hartford failed to disclose that it used $51 million of the funds' assets to broker-dealers
in order to satisfy some of Hartford's shelf space obligations).
289
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in damages.290
cases.291

The SEC, in contrast, distributed $3.87 billion from Fair Funds in such

If private litigation is actually unavailable or ineffective for cases against market

intermediaries, compensation from the Fair Fund is more persuasive.

This is because

“brokerage customers and mutual fund investors cannot self-insure through diversification
against the risk that their broker will charge excessive commissions, execute trades to
benefit the broker-dealer firm, or allow preferred clients to dilute the value of the
customer’s mutual fund investment.”292

Further, like enforcement actions against aiders

and abettors, this type of action carries less risk of the circularity problem.

The majority

of market intermediaries are not publicly held firms and, as a result, the cost of the penalty
is borne by shareholders who “manage the firms and are frequently themselves sanctioned
by the SEC for the same misconduct.”293

3. Individual Offenders
Lastly, the Fair Fund distribution is also appropriate when the SEC brings
enforcement actions against individual offenders such as the corporation’s directors and
officers responsible for the misconduct of the corporation.

As discussed earlier, large

penalties against the corporation may result in penalizing innocent shareholders who were

290

Velikonja, supra note 67, at 373.

291

Id.

292

Id. at 51; see Easterbrook, supra note 211, at 641 (authors in this article argued that an investor with a
diversified portfolio will not experience damages from fraud because their expected gains and losses net out);
for refutation of this article, see Alicia Davis Evans, The Investor Compensation Fund, 33 J. CORP. L. 223
(2007) (arguing that even diversified investors can suffer substantial loss from fraud and suggesting an
investor compensation fund).
293

Velikonja, supra note 67, at 377-78.
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already victimized.294

Thus, targeting culpable individuals can diminish the circularity

concerns and also increase the deterrence effect by internalizing the cost of wrongdoing.295
Further, to achieve such purposes, individuals should pay penalties out of their own pocket.
However, in private litigation, individuals rarely contribute to class action settlements due
to Directors and Officers liability insurance (D&O insurance) and corporate
indemnification. 296

In this case, the circularity concern still remains because a

corporation and its shareholders bear the costs of indemnification and higher insurance
premiums. 297

Unlike class actions, D&O insurance policies and indemnification are

unavailable or limited for SEC enforcement actions.298
The SEC itself has also expressed intention of seeking penalties from responsible
individuals in its statement concerning financial penalties announced in 2006.

299

However, some have questioned whether the SEC has made such efforts to charge

294

See discussion supra in Part IV(D)(1).

295

Ross MacDonald, Setting Examples, Not Settling: Toward a New SEC Enforcement Paradigm, 91 TEXAS
L. REV. 419, 440-41 (2012) (arguing that “[t]he solution [to efficiently deter wrongdoing] is not to increase
the monetary sanctions imposed on the corporations, but rather to initiate a sanctions regime that imposes
pain […] on the decision makers and managers, so that they will internalize the costs of violations and be
deterred from authorizing or engaging in them.”).
296

In securities class actions, individual defendants of corporate fraud cases rarely pay monetary sanctions
out-of-pocket because, in many cases, they are covered by Directors and Officers liability insurance (D&O
insurance) or indemnification. See Michael Klausner, Jason Hegland & Matthew Goforth, How Protective
is D&O Insurance in Securities Class Action?-An Update, 26 PLUS JOURNAL 1, 5 (2013), Working Paper
Series No. 446, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2260815 (showing that officers paid out-ofpocket in only two percent of settlements among securities class action cases filed between 2006 and 2010).
297

Winship, supra note 183, at 1129.

298

For more explanation, see Velikonja, supra note 67, at 384-86.

See SEC PENALTY POLICY, supra note 116 (“[w]here shareholders have been victimized by the violative
conduct, or by the resulting negative effect on the entity following its discovery, the Commission is expected
to seek penalties from culpable individual offenders acting for a corporation.”).
299
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individual offenders in corporate fraud cases.

When Judge Rakoff of the U.S. District

Court for the Southern District of New York rejected a proposed settlement between the
SEC and Bank of America (“BofA”) in 2009, he criticized the SEC for not bringing charges
against individual offenders, the BofA’s management responsible for false and misleading
proxy statement, and further pointed out that the SEC violated its own penalty policy. 300
Similar criticism was raised when the SEC settled the Goldman Sachs case related to
subprime mortgage CDO for $550 million in 2009, without charging any high-level
executives at Goldman Sachs—only a low-level trader, Fabrice Tourre.301
Interestingly, a study of the SEC’s enforcement cases filed from 2000 shows that
93% of all cases and 96% of fraud cases include individual defendants. 302

Further,

according to the study, the SEC named CEOs as defendants in 56% of cases, CFOs in 58%
of cases, and lower executives in 71% of cases, but it targeted solely lower level executives
in 7% of cases.303

In rough measure, individuals also paid money penalties in 65% of

cases and disgorgements in 45% of cases.304

Despite the favorable results of the study for

See SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (also stating that “since the fine is
imposed, not on the individuals putatively responsible, but on the shareholders, it is worse than pointless: it
further victimizes the victims.”).
300

301

See SEC v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., Litigation Release No. 21489, 98 SEC Docket 1192, 1192 (Apr. 16,
2010); see also MacDonald, supra note 295, at 423 (criticizing that the SEC rarely targeted individuals who
work at large commercial and investment banks and financial institutions).
302

See Michael Klausner & Jason Hegland, SEC Practice in Targeting and Penalizing Individuals
Defendants, The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation (Sept. 3,
2013 at 9:23 am), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/09/03/sec-practice-in-targeting-andpenalizing-individual-defendants/ (last visited on May 18, 2015).
303

Id.

304

Id.
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the SEC, such blame may originate from the SEC’s practice of charging individuals in only
certain cases, for example, those related to large and influential investment banks after the
global financial crisis.305

The SEC may have other grounds for defending itself, but even

so, the SEC needs to increase its effort to improve transparency as well as consistency in
its enforcement actions.

305

MacDonald, supra note 295, at 433-34.
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V. Considering Public Compensation under the Legal Environment in Korea

Based on the discussion of the SEC’s Fair Fund, this Part spotlights the issues that
financial regulators and legislators should consider in order to enhance public
compensation.

Specifically, this Part focuses on the legal and regulatory considerations

the Korean government should take when implementing monetary compensation such as
the Fair Fund scheme.

A. Compensatory Aspect Should Be Considered in Monetary Sanctions

It is unthinkable to implement monetary compensation like the Fair Fund
distribution in Korea, absent regulator’s authority to impose strong monetary sanctions on
violators.

In this respect, the current authority to impose monetary sanctions held by

Korean financial regulators needs to be reviewed.

1. Current monetary sanctions in financial regulation
Once the FSS brings violations of financial laws to light in the examination or
investigation process, the FSC and FSS proceed with disciplinary actions to impose
sanctions on violators pursuant to relevant financial laws.

Though disciplinary actions

against violators can be enforced with monetary and non-monetary sanctions, 306 the

306

Non-monetary sanctions against financial institutions, which are provided in current statutes, are divided
into business sanctions and professional sanctions. Business sanctions include revocation of business
licenses, suspension of businesses, shut-down or suspension of branches, stop orders against illegal or
improper activities, orders to transfer contracts, orders to provide public notice or disclosure of the fact that
it has been subjected to a measure due to its violation, warning to the institution as a whole, and caution to
the institution as a whole. Professional sanctions include sanctions for officers such as demand for dismissal,
78

current disciplinary system has strongly relied on non-monetary sanctions, especially
professional sanctions against officers and employees of financial institutions307 However,
this tendency has been criticized in that too much emphasis on non-monetary sanctions
may weaken the self-regulatory function of financial institutions and may not have a
deterrence effect because such sanctions do not impose a substantial loss to financial
institutions.308

Thus, cases in which regulators impose monetary sanctions in addition to

non-monetary sanctions to enhance the effectiveness of financial regulation are increasing.

i.

Typical form of monetary sanction

Under many financial laws, monetary sanctions have typically been provided in
the form of a ‘fine’, which is a criminal penalty, or a ‘fine for negligence’, which is a
monetary sanction imposed by an administrative agency. 309

However, such monetary

sanctions have revealed some limitations as a means of achieving regulatory goals.

First,

suspension of his or her duties, reprimand warning, warning for attention, and sanctions for employees such
as removal, suspension of his or her duties, salary reduction, or reprimand. Yong Chan Lee, supra note 8,
at 538. In translating the terms related to sanctions stipulated in the statutes into English, I followed the
translation of ‘Legislative Translation Center’ which officially provides English version of Statutes of the
South Korea. For reference to the English version of Korean Statutes, see Legislative Translation Center
website, http://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_service/main.do.
307

E.g., Id. at 539 (explaining that high dependency on professional sanctions was caused by legal and
practical limitations such as the fact that some financial institutions do not have internal control system
sufficient to allow financial institutions to sanction their employees at their disposal).
308

Id.

‘Fine for negligence’ is imposed on relatively minor violations that deter the laws from accomplishing its
administrative purposes. See Soo Hyun Ahn, Geumyunghaengjeong Jibhaengsudaneuloseo
Gwajinggeumjedo Geomto-2008nyeon Geumyungwiwonhoeui Gwajinggeumjedo Gaeseonbanganeul
Jungsimeulo [Review on Penalty Surcharge as Means of Enforcement for Financial Administration – Focused
on the FSC’s Proposed Reform on Penalty Surcharge], 32 BUSINESS & FINANCE LAW 76, 78 (Nov. 2008).
309

79

the standard of proof in criminal proceedings is higher than in civil or administrative
proceedings. Thus, if the prosecution fails to prove a case beyond a reasonable doubt,310
there exists the possibility that by failing to impose a penalty, the conduct that should be
regulated to prevent repetitive violations may continue undeterred.311

Second, a fine is

not an efficient measure to respond to similar violations in the financial market since a
criminal proceeding takes a long time before it comes to an end. 312
negligence is not a proper sanction for violations either.

Third, a fine for

Statutory amounts for fines for

negligence are generally much smaller than those for fines.

For example, the Financial

Investment Services and Capital Market Act (“FSCMA”) provides that the maximum
amount imposed in fines for negligence is 50 million won (approximately 45,000 dollars,
assuming 1 USD = 1,100 KRW), compared to that for fines which is 2 billion won
(approximately 1.8 million dollars).

Even taking into account the fact that it is a sanction

for relatively minor violations, such a low amount is unlikely sufficient to achieve any
regulatory purposes.313

310

Id. at 77 (suggesting that complication, complexness and intelligence of conducts violating financial laws
and regulations can make burden of proof more problematic in criminal proceedings).
311

Won Woo Lee, Hyeonhaeng Geumyunggamdogbeobsang Gwajinggeumjedoui Jaengjeomgwa
Gaeseonbangan [Issues and Recommendations on Penalty Surcharge under Current Financial Laws], 15
BUSINESS & FINANCE LAW 58, 78 (Jan. 2006).
312

Byoung Youn Kim, supra note 8, at 78-79.

313

In this regard, the FSC announced a plan in 2013 that it would impose fines for negligence by multiplying
the penalty amount by the number of individual violations in order to enhance the effectiveness as a sanction,
instead of the longstanding practice that imposes the penalty within the upper limit provided in the statute
regardless of the number of violations. Thus, this change will lead to an increase in the amount of fines for
negligence imposed. Press Release, FSC, Geumyunggwanlyeon Gwataelyo Bugwachegye Jeonmyeon
Gaepyeon [Overall Reorganization of Imposition System on Fine for Negligence in Finance Area], June 16,
2013,
available
at
http://www.fsc.go.kr/info/ntc_news_view.jsp?bbsid=BBS0030&page=1&sch1=subject&sword=&r_url=&
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ii.

Penalty surcharge

To overcome the limitations of traditional monetary sanctions, the use of a ‘penalty
surcharge’ has been increasing in the administrative law area. A penalty surcharge is a
monetary remedy that an administrative agency is authorized to impose on violators for the
purpose of encouraging a regulated person to meet obligations required by law. 314

The

penalty surcharge was first introduced in 1980 to remove economic gains acquired by
violating the law by a business in the fair trade law area. 315

At this time, penalty

surcharges were understood as being similar to “disgorgement” or “restitution.” However,
as the use of penalty surcharge increased, a variety of “transformed” penalty surcharges
emerged.

For example, certain agencies impose penalty surcharges instead of ordering

the suspension of a business or in cases where a violator acquires no explicit gains.316

In

addition, in many cases, the amount of a penalty surcharge is reached by considering a
number of factors such as the seriousness of the violation, the duration and frequency of
the violation as well as the scale of gains acquired by the violation.317

Thus, the monetary

menu=7210100&no=29196 (last visited on May 18, 2015).
314

Penalty surcharge was first provided in Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act enacted in December
1980. Securities and Exchange Act first adopted this in April 1999 with regard to securities disclosure
violation.
315

Tae Woo Kim, Gwajinggeum Jedoui Ibbeoblonjeog Munjejeomgwa Gaeseonbangan [Legislative
Problems and Improvements on Penalty Surcharge], BEOBJE [LEGISLATION] 28, 30 (June 2013).
316

Yeongchan Choi, Gwajinggeum Jedoe Gwanhan Gochal: Hyeonhwanggwa Munjejeomeul Jungsimeulo
[Review on Penalty Surcharge], BEOBJE [LEGISLATION] 3, 9-10 (Nov. 2001).
317

E.g. see FSCMA § 430(2).
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penalty is now generally viewed as a method of “disgorgement” or “administrative
sanction.”318
Even though recent trends show that penalty surcharges are used as a means of
imposing sanctions,319 its nature is not viewed as a criminal punishment.

In a case where

the Fair Trade Commission (“FTC”) imposed a large surcharge upon related business
entities of a conglomerate that had conducted acts of unjust support in violation of a
provision of the Fair Trade Act, the Constitutional Court held that imposition of a penalty
surcharge is not an “exercise of the state authority to criminal punishment” and to impose
a criminal penalty and penalty surcharge simultaneously does not necessarily constitute
double jeopardy. 320

The Court also reasoned that ‘prevention and inhibition through

sanction’ is the original function of administrative regulations, and the double jeopardy
clause does not prohibit imposition of any and all sanctions or disadvantageous measures
in addition to criminal punishment.321

318

Dae bub won [Supreme Court], 2000 Du 6206 (Feb. 9, 2009); Heon beob jae pan so [Constitutional Court]
2001 Hun-Ka 25 (July 24, 2003); Kyoung-Hee Shin, A Study of Unfair Trading Practices and Regulatory
Sanctions on the Capital Market & Financial Investment Business Law, ILKAM LAW REVIEW, VOL 24, 341,
369-71 (2013).
319

As of 2010, 108 individual statutes provide monetary surcharges. Among them, ninety are classified as
substitution for order of suspension of business, eighteen are classified as administrative sanction. Kim, Tae
Woo, supra note 315, at 30.
2001 Hun-Ka 25, supra note 318 (stating that “the surcharge [] is not punishment as the exercise of the
state authority to criminal punishment prohibited by Article 13(1) of the Constitution, and is not in violation
of the principle against double jeopardy.”). However, Constitutional Court also made clear that “the state is
“not free from the restriction of the constitutional principle of proportionality,” and “the aggregate of various
sanctions should not be excessively grave compared with the unlawful act that is being sanctioned.”
320

321

Id.
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However, the penalty surcharge is still narrowly used in the financial law area.
Penalty surcharges are limited to certain types of regulatory violations related to the
prudential supervision of financial institutions such as the limitation on credit exposure or
investment of securities.

Significantly, under the FSCMA, a penalty surcharge is not

applicable to major violations in the securities law area such as insider trading, market
manipulation, and other fraudulent trading, except for violations of disclosure regulations.
Such violations are solely regulated by the criminal penalty such as imprisonment and
fine. 322

Thus, Korean financial watchdogs are rendered toothless in deterring such

fraudulent misconduct in the financial market: after completing an investigation, it merely
refers the case to the prosecution without its own remedy.
When the FSC proposed an amendment to the FSCMA in 2011 that included
provisions to regulate certain kinds of “market abuse,”323 and impose monetary surcharges
on such activities, the Ministry of Justice (“MOJ”) banned the bill; the FSC proposed the
bill without such provisions, and it passed Congress.

The opponents of the monetary

322

In such violation, a person is punished by imprisonment for up to 10 years or by a fine equivalent to one
to three times of the profit accrued or the loss avoided by a violation. If the amount equivalent to three times
the profit accrued or the loss avoided by a violation is 500 million won or less, the upper limit of the fine is
500 million won. FSCMA § 443.
323

The FSC proposed the bill to regulate certain types of activities which are not covered by existing insider
trading and market manipulation regulations. These include: (a) an activity ‘indirectly’ acquiring and using
material nonpublic information of a listed company in his transaction, (b) directly or indirectly acquiring
material nonpublic information by illegal means such as hacking, theft, fraud or threat, and using information
in his transaction, (c) an activity producing material nonpublic information in the course of performance of
the business and using information in his transaction, and (d) an activity unduly affecting market price
‘without manipulative intention’ such as sudden price change by trading program error. See FSC, press release,
Sijangjilseo Gyolanhaengwi Gyujeleul Wihan Jabonsijanggwa Geumyungtujaeobe Gwanhan Beoblyul
Ilbugaejeongbeoblyulan Gugmuhoeui Tonggwa [Amendment of the FSCMA to Regulate Market Abuse
Passed
the
Cabinet
Meeting]
(Dec.
23,
2014),
available
at
http://www.fsc.go.kr/info/ntc_news_view.jsp?bbsid=BBS0030&page=1&sch1=subject&sword=%EC%9E
%90%EB%B3%B8%EC%8B%9C%EC%9E%A5&r_url=&menu=7210100&no=30174 (last visited on
May 18, 2015).
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surcharge argued that the expansive use of the monetary surcharge to deter violations is not
desirable, that the penalty surcharge is not directly related to victims’ relief of damages,
and that imposing the penalty surcharge on activities without specific intention needs to be
reassessed.324

They also reasoned that the nature of traditional securities violations is

similar to ‘false pretense,’ which is in the sphere of criminal law, and accordingly it cannot
be regulated by administrative sanctions.325
However, just after a new President took office in February 2013, the FSC pushed
the plan forward again.

At this time, the FSC proposed the bill without opposition of the

MOJ and the bill passed Congress at the end of 2014.326

Interestingly, passage of the

Amendment meant that traditional securities law violations are solely regulated by criminal
penalty and newly established ‘market abuse’ type violations are solely regulated by
administrative sanctions—the penalty surcharge.327

This dichotomy seems to stem from

the concern for double jeopardy or excessiveness of dual sanctions, even though the
Constitutional Court previously upheld it constitutionality, and the view that the

324

Min Gyo Kim, A Study on Reform of Unfair Trading System in Korean SEA, YGLB, VOL 3-1, 71, 79
(2011).
Neunghyeon Kim, Beobmubu Banbale Jeolchungan Malyeondeung Ibbeob Nanhangtss … Je2
Gichogbeob' Ulyeo [The FSC’s Step-back by the MOJ’s Opposition Forewarned Tough Road to Congress. It
Be a Return Match Following Previous Debate on Corporate Restructuring Promotion Act?] (June 6, 2011),
Seoul
Economy,
available
at
http://economy.hankooki.com/lpage/economy/201106/e2011060617461770070.htm (last visited on May 18,
2015).
325

The MOJ’s silence was partly due to the President’s strong drive for eradication of fraudulent activities
in the capital market, which was one of her pledges in the Presidential Election Campaign. The Amendment
of the FSCMA will be effective as of July 1, 2015.
326

327

The Amendment of the FSCMA does not provide any criminal penalty provision for violation of
prohibition of market abuse.
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appropriateness of a sanction can be divided by the seriousness of the regulated activity.
However, it is still questionable whether traditional securities violations can be effectively
deterred without administrative sanctions, 328 and whether market abuse activities are
really less serious than traditionally regulated activities.329
Another issue with the penalty surcharge is that it cannot be imposed on
individuals except for violations related to registration statements, tender offer statements,
shareholder reports, and newly established market abuse.

This reflects the view that

imposition of a penalty surcharge on individuals who violate the law for the benefit of the
corporation weakens the corporation’s effort to prevent its employees from violating the
law through preventive measures such as internal controls because the effect of a sanction
is not imputed to the entity. 330

However, scholars argue that a penalty surcharge for

individuals is necessary to enhance the deterrence effect for illegal conduct by individuals,
especially a corporation’s officers, major shareholders, or affiliated persons.331
The maximum amount for a penalty surcharge under the FSCMA cannot exceed 2
billion won in public disclosure violations or 40% of the total amount in a financial
investment business entity’s violation of the restrictions on trading with major

328

See discussion supra in Part III(C).

329

For example, according to such dichotomy, a tippee is punished differently, depending on whether he
‘directly’ acquired material nonpublic information from the initial tipper or not. However, it is questionable
whether such distinction has a reasonable ground. Unlike this, in the U.S., a tippee’s liability derives from
that of a tipper. A tippee can civilly or criminally be held liable if the insider has breached a fiduciary duty
and the tippee knows or should know that there has been a breach. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983);
see also United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. N.Y. 2014) (in this case, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit clarified the requirements of tippee liability).
330

Soo Hyun Ahn, supra note 309, at 96.

331

Id. at 96-97; Lee, Won Woo, supra note 311, at 62.
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shareholders.332

In contrast, the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (“Fair Trade

Act”) allows the FTC to impose penalty surcharges in proportion to the turnover resulting
from a violation.333

Partly due to such differences, the FSC imposed only 37.9 billion

won of penalty surcharges and fines for negligence in 2013, compared to the FTC which
imposed 418.4 billion won of penalty surchargse in 2013.334

2. Need for penalty surcharge in financial regulation
Today, both scholars and financial regulators recognize that penalty surcharges
should be applied broadly in the financial law area to enhance the deterrence of serious
misconduct by financial institutions and other market participants.
is gathering strength after several recent financial scandals.

Specifically, this view

The government recently

pushed forward imposition of the punitive penalty surcharge against financial institutions
that intentionally or gross-negligently leaked credit information by violating the ‘Use and
Protection of Credit Information Act.’335

332

FSCMA § 429(1).

333

Fair Trade Act § 6.

However, political parties banned the FSC’s

334

Press release, FTC, 2013nyeon Gongjeongwi Tonggyeyeonbo Balgan [FTC Issued Statistics Yearbook of
2013], April 17, 2014, available at http://www.ftc.go.kr/news/ftc/reportView.jsp?report_data_no=5619 (last
visited on May 18, 2015); Jeong Won Bae, Geumyungwi, Hoesumoshan Gwajinggeum 400 Eogwon
Yugbagtss … “Kaemkoe Hoesueobmu Witag” [Uncollected Penalty Surcharge FSC Is Approaching 40
Billion Won … FSC Official Said “FSC Will Refer Collection To Kamco], CHOSUN BIZ, July 17, 2014,
available at http://biz.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2014/07/17/2014071702572.html (last visited on May
18, 2015).
335

For example, responding to massive credit card information leak, the FSC originally announced the plan
to impose the punitive penalty surcharge (e.g., imposing certain percentage of sales amounts related to the
violation as penalty surcharge without the upper limit) in cases where financial institutions intentionally or
gross-negligently divulge consumers’ credit information and do harm to them. See Press Release, FSC,
Geumyungbunya Gaeinjeongbo Yuchul Jaebalbangji Jonghabdaechaeg [Comprehensive Plans to Prevent a
Recurrence of Personal Information Leak in the Financial Sector], March 10, 2014, available at
http://www.fsc.go.kr/info/ntc_news_view.jsp?bbsid=BBS0030&page=1&sch1=subject&sword=%EA%B0
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plan, arguing that the punitive penalty surcharge would only increase the government’s tax
revenue without giving any benefit to injured consumers.336

To meet the political parties’

demand, the FSC proposed an Amendment of the Act, which allows victims of the
information leak to seek punitive damages against financial institutions, instead of the
punitive penalty surcharge.337

However, the proposed Amendment also allows the FSC

to impose the penalty surcharge on violators up to five billion won.338

3. Importance of compensatory aspect in monetary sanctions
Strong monetary sanctions against violators of financial laws are a prerequisite for
Fair Fund-type compensation schemes.

However, this does not mean that the penalty

surcharge should be expanded for the purpose of compensating injured financial consumers.
Whether penalty surcharges should be given in specific cases depends on many factors
such as the magnitude of economic gains from the violation, the effectiveness of deterring
repetitive misconduct, etc.

And as the National Assembly pointed out, where the

collected penalty monies are finally deposited plays an important role in discussing the

%9C%EC%9D%B8%EC%A0%95%EB%B3%B4&r_url=&menu=7210100&no=29729 (last visited on
May 18, 2015).
336

See Jingbeoljeog Gwajinggeum? Jingbeoljeog Sonhaebaesang? Gongeun Tto Gughoelo [Punitive Penalty
Surcharge? Punitive Damage? Decision is Up to the National Assembly], NEWS 1, Jan. 22, 2014, available
at http://news1.kr/articles/?1507577 (last visited on May 18, 2015).
337

FSC, Sinyongjeongboui Iyong Mich Bohoe Gwanhan Beoblyul Jeonbugaejeongbeoblyulan Ibbeobyego
[Notice on the Proposed Amendment of the USE AND PROTECTION OF CREDIT INFORMATION ACT], Nov. 11,
2014,
available
at
http://www.fsc.go.kr/know/law_prev_view.jsp?bbsid=BBS0120&page=1&sch1=&sch2=&sch3=&sword=
&r_url=&menu=7410100&no=30307 (last visited on May 18, 2015).
338

Id.
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utilization of monetary sanctions in this specific area.

Though imposing large penalty

surcharges on violators may deter repetition of similar violations, it may also exhaust
resources necessary to compensate victims injured by such violations, and accordingly,
victims may not recover their damages.

Thus, this may raise political concerns because

the National Congress is deemed to speak for the interest of the general public.

For

instance, the Fair Trade Commission (“FTC”), which imposes hundreds of billions of won
in penalty surcharges yearly on businesses that violate fair trade laws, has been criticized
for merely transferring penalties to the National Treasury, instead of using them for the
benefit of harmed consumers. 339

Reflecting such voices, twenty-four Congressmen

recently proposed a bill intended to establish a fund sourced from monetary penalties to
support victims. 340

Therefore, returning money to injured victims contributes to

broadening the application of penalty surcharges in the financial area.

4. Considering the penalty surcharge in terms of compensation
As discussed in the SEC’s Fair Fund history, an agency’s effort to compensate
victims by distributing penalties may cause other adverse effects, such as the circularity
problem or conflicts with the bankruptcy code.

In addition, the degree of adverse effects

differs depending on which entities the penalty is imposed.

Thus, it is of value to

339

See, e.g., Boyeon Hwang, Gongjeongwi Gwajinggeum Iljeongbiyul Sobija Pihaebosange Sseoya [The
FTC Needs To Spend Certain Percentage of Money Penalties in Compensating Consumers’ Damages], THE
HANKYOREH, April 4, 2011 (pointing out that the government needs to establish the separate public fund to
directly recompensate consumers’ damages caused by unfair trading activities of companies), available at
http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/economy/economy_general/471398.html (last visited on May 18, 2015).
340

See National Policy Committee, Dogjeomgyuje mich gongjeonggeolaee gwanhan beoblyul deung
wibanhaengwi pihaeja jiwongigeumbeoban geomtobogoseo [Review on the bill for the fund supporting
victims harmed by violations of Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act, Etc.] (Feb. 2014).
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prioritize different types of entities to assess whether it will be effective to seek the
monetary penalty.

This is especially important when the agency intends to seek penalty

surcharges in a case where the penalty ultimately can be imputed to those who did not
directly or indirectly benefit from the violation.341
In this regard, imposing the penalty surcharge against corporations is most
problematic because, as shown in the Fair Fund cases, it is likely to raise the circularity
concern that the penalty causes harm to innocent shareholders. 342

Similarly, large

penalties against a bankrupt corporation also cause serious concern with respect to creditor
protection.343

Thus, financial regulators should recognize the danger of imposing penalty

surcharges on a public company and consider more proper measures to minimize harm to
interested parties affected by the penalty.344

Instead, the regulators should seek penalty

surcharges against individual offenders such as officials and large shareholders as well as
financial institutions and aiders and abettors with deep pockets such as investment banks
and accounting firms.

Targeting such offenders can contribute not only to removing

incentives for misconduct, but also securing resources for compensation.

341

The legislative history of the Remedies Act includes the following passage:
[B]ecause the costs of such penalties may be passed on to shareholders, the Committee intends that a
penalty be sought when the violation results in an improper benefit to shareholders. [When]
shareholders are the principal victims of the violations, the Committee expects that the SEC, when
appropriate, will seek penalties from the individual offenders acting for a corporate issuer. S. Rep.
No. 101-337, at 17 (1990).

342

See discussion supra Part IV(D)(1).

343

See discussion supra Part IV(D)(2).

344

In corporate fraud cases, injured investors may seek compensation from corporations through securities
class actions even though public compensation is unavailable. See discussion supra Part IV(D)(3).
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B. Availability of Private Action Should Be Considered

Since recovering damages incurred by a financial institution’s misconduct is
generally resolved through private litigation, allowing an exception to this general principle
requires adequate policy grounds.

As witnessed in recent cases in Korea, financial

incidents have a tendency to cause massive harm to financial consumers.

In such

situations, class action suits are considered an appropriate legal remedy to resolve
collective harms where a large number of victims are involved.

Korea introduced the

class action system in 2005 in order to efficiently seek relief for collective injuries that
occurred in the course of securities trading.345

However, the current class action system

only applies to certain limited types of securities claims.346

In addition, it is also argued

that the requirements for a class action lawsuit, such as those for representative party and
attorney, are too strict347 and the cost burden of lawsuits is too high.348

Partly due to such

345

Securities Related Class Action Act. For discussion on class actions in Korea, see generally, Young Hoa
Son, Improvement of Securities Class Action System, 24-4 COMMERCIAL CASES STUDY 45 (2011.12); JungSik Choi, Proposal for the Invigoration of Securities Class Action System, 53 BEOBHAG YEONGU [JOURNAL
OF JURISPRUDENCE] 311 (2014).
346

To be eligible, securities should be issued by a stock-listed corporation and claims should be related to
the material misstatement on the registration statement or periodic reports (i.e., annual report), insider trading,
market manipulation, or accounting auditor’s liability. Securities Related Class Action Act § 3.
347

The Act exemplifies the person who is likely to receive the largest economic benefit from the class action
as a representative party. However, it can be problematic because it is not sure that such person would always
recover his loss through class action. In addition, an attorney who has engaged in more than three class
action lawsuits during the preceding three years is disqualified from becoming the attorney of the plaintiff.
Securities Related Class Action Act § 11(1), (3). See also Jung-Sik Choi, supra note 345, at 324-25.
348

The plaintiffs have to pay costs necessary for the notice, public notification and appraisal and also pay
fees for stamps affixed to the written complaint of the class action lawsuit, which amount up to 50 million
won. See id. at 325-26.
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restrictions on class actions, only eight class action lawsuits have been brought since the
system was put into effect.349
The limitations of class actions may justify public compensation for widespread
harm. Unlike in the U.S. where class actions are widely used, current class actions in
Korea do not cover major violations in the financial area except for certain securities related
matters.

Moreover, in cases where a majority of victims suffer small amounts of damage,

such claims may not succeed in private litigations but only class actions. However, such
cases should also be brought in order to deter future violations by forcing violators to pay
the financial damages suffered by victims.350

In such cases, monetary sanctions imposed

by financial regulators and a subsequent distribution of the penalty may be the most
effective way to recover victims’ losses as well as to deter similar violations.
Criticism that the SEC’s Fair Fund simply duplicates the class action does not hold
true in Korea. Policymakers should consider the fact that the availability of class action
suits in Korea is very limited when designing the compensation scheme.

In this regard,

priority consideration for public compensation should be given to claims in which class
actions are unavailable, leaving corporate fraud cases in which class actions are available
out of the discussion.
In addition, some argue that FDM can work as an alternative for class actions in
claims against financial institutions. However, FDM may not be an adequate measure

Jibdansosong Yumyeongmusiltss … Doib 10 Nyeongan 8 Geonppun [Class Action Is Almost Obsolete
… Only 8 Cases Were Brought For Past 10 Years], SEGYEILBO, Nov. 23, 2014, available at
http://www.segye.com/content/html/2014/11/23/20141123002269.html (last visited on May 18, 2015).
349

350

For a discussion on the compensation and deterrence rational for class actions, see Coffee, supra note 179,
at 1545-56.
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because collective mediation procedures, which are essential for claims related to massive
harm with a large number of victims, is not yet introduced.351

In addition, FDMC has no

authority to bind interested parties to its decision, even though, in fact, financial institutions
often accept its decision in many cases due to the regulator’s broad authority to supervise
them. 352

Thus, it is difficult to consider FDM as it currently stands as a stable

compensation device to resolve such massive claims.

C. Standards and Procedures for Distribution Should Be Provided

First, policymakers in Korea should establish statutory grounds and standards for
determining when a penalty surcharge collected from violators is distributed to harmed
financial consumers.

Unlike the SEC, which has broad authority to decide whether it

creates a Fair Fund, it is not easy for administrative agencies in Korea to exercise authority
unless it is empowered by statute.353

The lack of clear standards might cause conflicts

between harmed consumers who benefit from the distribution, and taxpayers who are afraid
to bear higher taxes that would not exist otherwise.

Moreover, absent such standards,

financial regulators might confront political pressure and complaints from victims
demanding for distributions, even in situations where public compensation is unlikely to

351

For limitations of the current FDM system, see discussion supra in Part II(B)(3)(i).

According to an anonymous FSS official, financial institutions rarely file lawsuits to object to the FDMC’s
mediation decision.
352

353

According to the general principles of administrative laws in Korea, the government action that imposes
a burden on related persons should have grounds for such action in the statute. However, even government
actions that benefit related persons are generally grounded in a statute.
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be feasible.

Thus, providing clear standards in the related laws and rules can help

financial consumers reasonably anticipate whether public compensation for their harm is
available.
In addition, sufficient procedures in the distribution process should also be
developed in order to protect related parties’ interests and make an adequate and effective
distribution. As seen in the SEC’s cases such as the Global Research Analyst Settlement,
the SEC was criticized for its lack of procedural protections, which limited participation of
parties interested in the Fair Fund distribution, and caused the agency’s failure to
adequately compensate investors.354

To prevent such mishap, the opportunity should be

provided for interested parties to participate and express their opinions in the course of
developing the distribution plan.

Doing so enables the financial regulators to properly

identify parties and claims that should be included in the distributions.
Further, in designing procedures for distribution, policymakers should consider
how to expedite the distribution process.

As seen in the Fair Fund distribution process, it

can take over two years from creation to termination of the Fair Fund, and the SEC has
continuously made efforts to expedite the distribution process.

In this regard, regulatory

agencies should build a close collaboration with the judiciary and financial intermediaries
to acquire information essential to distribution, such as eligible claimants and their share
of the fund.
On the other hand, there may be a concern that victims are compensated more than
the financial losses actually incurred in cases where victims seek private litigation after

354

See discussion supra Part III(E)(5).
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they recover their damage fully or partly from distributions paid by the defendants.

Thus,

the court needs to consider recoveries from other sources such as penalties in assessing
damages to prevent over-compensation.355

D. The Agency’s Mission and Resources Should Be Considered

Financial regulatory agencies’ missions and resources are also important factors to
consider in designing an efficient compensation scheme.

As provided in the statute, FSC

and FSS’s mission is to assist the development of financial industry, maintain the stability
of the financial market, form fair market practices, and protect financial consumers.356 To
achieve their missions in cooperation with the FSC, the FSS supervises and examines
financial institutions, oversees and investigates illegal activities and misconduct in the
financial market, and addresses financial consumers’ complaints and mediates financial
disputes.357

On the other hand, just like other agencies, the FSS also has limited resources.

Specifically, since the FSS is primarily funded by fees paid by the regulated financial
institutions and securities issuers, expansion of its resources would increase the burden on
market participants.358

355

See supra note 155 and accompanying text.

356

Act on the Establishment, etc. of Financial Services Commission §1.

357

In establishing compensatory schemes, final authority related to compensation such as approval of
distribution plan would be reserved by the FSC. However, since the FSS would deal with practical matters,
functions and resources of the FSS are important in the discussion. For FSS’ major functions and
organization, see FSS HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 17-20.
358

The FSS adopts zero-balance budget system and its operating revenues are composed of contributions
from the regulated financial institutions, securities issuers and Bank of Korea, and other revenues. As of
fiscal year of 2014, contributions from the regulated financial institutions and securities issuers take up 70
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In this respect, a compensation scheme should be designed to minimize conflicts
with the FSS’s other major functions and resources.

As previously reviewed, scholars

pointed out that the SEC’s compensatory effort may weaken the SEC’s other functions or
conflict with them.359

Carrying out a compensatory system within the FSS may divert the

agency’s resources in order to establish a new office with skilled staff, develop
computerized systems, and administer distributions.

More seriously, taking on a

compensatory role may lead the agency to increase efforts on high-profile cases and pay
less attention to other enforcement actions, which do not produce compensation, but are
necessary to maintain market confidence and protect financial consumers.

To prevent

such danger, the FSS should set the priorities and strategic goals of its different missions
and evaluate them objectively. The FSS also needs to reorganize closely related functions
to manage its resources effectively and avoid conflicts among them.

For example, the

FSS has an Enforcement Review Department that reviews sanctions proposed by the
Examination Departments and Investment Departments.

Thus, a new office to take

charge of compensation needs to be organized within the same division as the Enforcement
Review Department to avoid conflicts between the two functions and enhance
consistency.360

Further, in order to relieve the burden of administering funds, the FSS

percent and 27 percent of the total, respectively. FSS, FSS website, Disclosure of Management Information:
Budget Analysis: 2014, available at http://www.fss.or.kr/fss/kr/open/finance/budget.jsp (last visited on May
18, 2015).
359

See discussion supra Part IV(D)(4).

360

The SEC also established the Office of Collections and Distributions within the Enforcement Division.
See supra note 120-21 and accompanying text.
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needs to appoint fund administrators to administer distribution processes according to the
distribution plan.
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V. Conclusion

This study explored the Fair Fund program administered by the SEC in the United
States and suggested several considerations Korea should take into account in designing a
compensation scheme.

Even though Korea’s financial regulatory system has followed

those of the U.S. in many areas, the authority over enforcement actions shows major
differences between both countries’ regulatory agencies.

Thus, it is very unlikely that the

Korean regulatory system will adopt the Fair Fund program as the U.S did without
considering such differences.
However, analyzing the Fair Fund provides important lessons for Korea as it
develops its own compensation model.

Most of all, although current discussions about

expanding financial regulator’s monetary sanctions are made without considering the
utilization of the penalty surcharge and its impact on the financial regulatory system,
legislators and regulators should recognize that both are closely related and should be
discussed at the same time.

Further, it should also be noted that emphasizing the

compensatory role of financial regulators might compromise the traditional mission of
deterrence unless it is supported by substantive and procedural principles that are clearly
established and prioritized, and the regulatory agencies maintain sufficient resources.
Thus, in developing a compensation scheme in Korea, the focus should be on how the
regulators can enhance their compensatory role while maintaining the deterrence effect of
securities enforcement actions.
A compensation scheme that distributes monies collected through monetary
sanctions requires many changes to the current legal and regulatory system of Korea, such
97

as the penalty surcharge and class action systems.

Thus, it may take a long time to

establish such a scheme in Korea even when the government and the National Assembly
attempt to push it forward.

In this respect, it is also important to consider improvements

to the current compensatory system such as the FDM in the short term in order to resolve
the urgent matter to relieve widespread harms occurring in the financial markets.
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